
31 August 2008
The Republic of Bulgaria

30 August 2008
"The Banks" and "the International Financiers"

Our Lord drove the money changers out of the Temple; it is high time the International Financiers be driven out
by Alain Pilote
The following essay is reprinted from Michael (January - February 1991). It has been slightly edited in terms of its content (simply to eliminate an unnecessary reference to another article).
As most of the regular readers of the “Michael” Journal should know, the fundamental flaw of the present financial system is that all the existing money has been created by the banks, as a debt: banks create new money, money that did not exist before, every time they make a loan. These loans must be returned to the banks, but increased with interest.
Even coins and bank notes, which, in Canada, are respectively issued by the Canadian Mint and the Bank of Canada — two State-owned institutions — are put into circulation only when they are lent at interest by the private chartered banks. And it is precisely this interest, which is charged at the origin of money, that creates the problem, a mathematical impossibility to pay the loan back: the bank creates the principal it lends, but does not create the interest that must also be paid back.
For example, let us suppose that the bank lends you $100, at 10 per cent interest. The bank creates $100, but wants you to pay back $110. You can pay back $100, but not $110: the $10 for the interest does not exist, since only the bank has the right to create money, and it created $100, not $110. The only way to pay back $110, when there is only $100 in existence, is to also borrow this $10 from the bank... and your problem is not solved; it has only gotten worse: you now owe the bank $110, plus a 10-per-cent interest, which makes $121... and as years pass, your debt gets bigger; there is no way to get out of it.
Some borrowers, taken individually, can manage to pay back their loans in totality, the principal plus the interest, but all the borrowers as a whole can not. If some borrowers manage to pay back $110 when they received only $100, it is because they take the $10 that is missing in the money put into circulation through the loans granted to other borrowers. In order for some borrowers to be able to pay back their loans, others must go bankrupt. And it is only a matter of time before all the borrowers, without exception, find it impossible to pay the banker back.
And note that even with an interest rate of only 1 per cent, the debt would still be unpayable: if you borrow $100 at 1-per-cent interest, you will have to pay back $101 at the end of the year, while there is only $100 in circulation. This means that any interest charged on newly-created money — even a 1-per-cent interest — is usury, is a robbery, is a racket.
Some may say that if one does not want to get into debt, one has only not to borrow. But if no one borrowed money from the banks, there would simply not be a penny in circulation at all: in order to have money in circulation in our country — if only a few dollars — someone — an individual, a corporation, or the Government—must borrow these dollars from the bank, at interest. And this money borrowed from the bank cannot remain in circulation indefinitely: it must be returned to the bank when the loan is due... and returned with the interest, of course.
Unpayable debts
This means that just to maintain the same amount of money in circulation, year after year, unpayable debts must pile up. In the case of public debts, the bankers are satisfied as long as the interest charges on the debts are paid. Is it a favour they do for us? No, it only delays the financial impasse for a few years since, after a while, even the interest on the debt becomes unpayable. [. . . .]
If debts do not pile up, there can be no money in our country. So one should not be surprised to see the public debts of all the nations reaching astronomical proportions: for example, Canada's public debt, which was $24 billion in 1975, reached the $200-billion mark ten years later. (In January, 1995, the debt of the Canadian Government reached the $500-billion mark, with interest charges of about $49 billion per year, or one-third of all the taxes collected by the Federal Government. If one adds the debts of the provinces, corporations, and individuals, one gets a total debt in Canada of over 2,800 billion dollars.) Even though you take all the money that exists in Canada, even the money in saving accounts, it will not be sufficient to pay off the debt. And the same situation prevails in all the countries in the world.
It is impossible to pay off the public debt, since it is made up of money that does not exist. Many Third-World nations have realized this absurdity, and stopped servicing their debts. In fact, these loans to Third-World countries are far from helping them: on the contrary, they impoverish these nations even more, since these nations must pledge to pay the bankers back more money than what was lent, which makes money tighter among the people, and condemns them to live in poverty and starvation.
But can a country be run without borrowing the bankers' debt-money? Yes, and it is very easy to understand: It is not the banker that gives money its value; it is the production of the country. Without the production of all the citizens in the country, the figures lent by the bankers would be worthless. So, in reality, since this new money is based on the production of society, this money also belongs to society. Simple justice therefore requires it to be issued by society — interest free — and not by the banks. Instead of having a money created by the banks, a banking credit, one would have a money created by society, a social credit.
Our Lord drives the money changers out of the Temple
As Louis Even said, “Interest at the origin of money is illegitimate, absurd, anti-social, and anti-arithmetic.” To charge interest on newly-created money is therefore a very great crime that cannot be justified. As a matter of fact, the only passage in the Gospel where it is mentioned that Jesus used force, is when He drove the money changers out of the Temple with a scourge of cords, and overthrew their tables (as reported in Matthew 21:12-13 and Mark 11:15-19), precisely because they were lending money at interest.
There was, at that time, a law that the tithes or taxes of the Temple could be paid only in one certain coin called the “half shekel of the sanctuary”, of which the money changers had managed to obtain the monopoly. There were several different coins at that time, but the people had to obtain this particular coin with which to pay their Temple Tax. Moreover, the doves and the animals that the people bought for sacrifice also could only be bought with this same special coin that the money changers exchanged to the pilgrims, but at a cost of twice or more times its actual worth, when it was used to buy commodities. So Jesus overthrew their tables and said: “My house shall be called a house of prayer; but you have made it a den of thieves.”
In his book, Money and Its True Function, F.R. Burch has the following comment on this text of the Gospel:
“As long as Christ confined His teachings to the realm of morality and righteousness, He was undisturbed; it was not till He assailed the established economic system and cast out the profiteers and overthrew the tables of the money changers, that He was doomed. The following day, He was questioned, betrayed on the second, tried on the third, and on the fourth, crucified.”
One would be tempted to make the parallel with the Pilgrims of Saint Michael, the “White Berets” of the “Michael” Journal: as long as they content themselves with talking about moral renovation, the Financiers can still tolerate it; but when the “White Berets” dare to attack the debt-money system, this is an “unforgivable sin”, and the Financiers are then ready to do everything to silence the “White Berets”. But these attempts of the Financiers are vain, since the truth always triumphs in the end.
The teaching of the Church
The Bible contains several texts that clearly condemn the lending of money at interest. Moreover, more than 300 years before Jesus Christ, the great Greek philosopher Aristotle also condemned lending at interest, pointing out that “money, being naturally barren, to make it breed money is preposterous.” Furthermore, the Fathers of the Church, since the remotest times, always denounced, unequivocally, usury. Saint Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa Theologica (2, 2, Q. 78), thus summarized the teaching of the Church on lending money at interest:
“It is written in the Book of Exodus (22, 24): `If you lend money to any of my people who is poor, that dwells with you, you shall not be hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with usury.' He who takes usury for a loan of money acts unjustly, for he sells what does not exist, and such an action evidently constitutes an inequality and, consequently, an injustice... It follows then that it is wrong in itself to take a price (usury) for the use of money lent, and as in the case of other offenses against justice, one is bound to make restitution of his unjustly acquired money.”
In reply to the text of the Gospel on the parable of the talents (Matthew 25:14-30 and Luke 19:12-27) which, at first sight, seems to justify interest (“Wicked and slothful servant... why did you not put my money into the bank, so that I might have recovered it with interest when I came?”), Saint Thomas Aquinas wrote: “The interest mentioned in the Gospel must be taken in a figurative sense; it means the additional spiritual goods asked of us by God, who wants us to always make better use of the goods He entrusted us with, but this is for our benefit and not His.”
So this text of the Gospel cannot justify interest since, as Saint Thomas says, “an argument cannot be based on figurative expressions.”
Another passage of the Bible that presents difficulties is Deuteronomy 23:20-21: “You shall not demand interest from your brother on a loan of money or food or of anything else. You may demand interest from a foreigner, but not from your brother.” Saint Thomas explains:
“The Jews were forbidden to take interest from `their brothers', that is to say, from other Jews; this means that demanding interest on a loan from anyone is wrong, strictly speaking, for one must consider every man as `one's neighbour and brother', especially according to the evangelical law that must rule mankind. So the Psalmist, talking about the just man, says unreservedly: `he who lends not his money at usury' (14:4) and Ezekiel (18:17): `a son who accepts no interest or usury'.”
If the Jews were allowed to demand interest from a foreigner, Saint Thomas wrote, it was tolerated in order to avoid a greater evil, for fear that they might charge interest to other Jews, the worshippers of the true God. Saint Ambrose, commenting on the same text, gives to the word “foreigners” the meaning of “enemies”, and concludes: “One may seek interest from the one he legitimately wants to harm, from the one whom it is lawful to wage war with.”
Saint Ambrose also said: “What is usury, if not killing a man?”
Saint John Chrysostom: “Nothing is more shameful or cruel than usury.”
Saint Leo: “The avarice that claims to do its neighbour a good turn while it deceives him is unjust and insolent... He who, among the other rules of a pious conduct, will not have lent his money at usury, will enjoy eternal rest... whereas he who gets richer to the detriment of others deserves, in return, eternal damnation.”
In 1311, at the Council of Vienna, Pope Clement V declared null and void all secular legislation in favour of usury, and “all who fall into the error of obstinately, maintaining that the exaction of usury is not sinful, shall be punished as heretics.”
On November 1, 1745, Pope Benedict XIV issued the encyclical letter Vix Pervenit, addressed to the Bishops of Italy, about contracts, and in which usury, or money-lending at interest, is clearly condemned. On July 29, 1836, Pope Gregory XVI extended this encyclical to the whole Church. It says:
“The kind of sin called usury, which lies in the loan, consists in the fact that someone, using as an excuse the loan itself — which by nature requires one to give back only as much as one has received — demands to receive more than is due to him, and consequently maintains that, besides the capital, a profit is due to him, because of the loan itself. It is for this reason that any profit of this kind that exceeds the capital is illicit and usurious.
“And in order not to bring upon oneself this infamous note, it would be useless to say that this profit is not excessive but moderate; that it is not large, but small... For the object of the law of lending is necessarily the equality between what is lent and what is given back... Consequently, if someone receives more than he lent, he is bound in commutative justice to restitution...”
The teaching of the Church on this matter is therefore quite clear but, as Louis Even wrote: “In spite of all Christian teaching to the contrary, the practice has made so much headway that, so as not to lose in the furious competition around the fertility of money, everybody must behave today as if it was natural for money to breed money. The Church has not abrogated her laws, but it has become impossible for her to insist on their application.”
Islamic banking
On this matter, it is interesting to consider the experience of the Islamic banks: the Koran — the holy book of the Moslems — forbids usury, as the Bible of the Christians does. But the Moslems took these words seriously and have set up, since 1979, a banking system that conforms with the rules of the Koran: Islamic banks charge no interest on either current or deposit accounts. They invest in business, and pay a share of any profits to their depositors. This is not the Social Credit system implemented in its entirety yet but, at least, it is a more than worthy attempt at putting the banking system in keeping with moral laws. On this point, the Christians should be inspired by this example of the Moslems.
Interest and dividends
This article should have shown clearly enough that any interest on newly-created money is unjustifiable. But this may bring some fear among those who have money deposited in banks: if interest is thus condemned, will they still receive some interest on their money deposited in banks?
Mr. Even concluded that money can claim dividends where there are fruits. Otherwise, no. But in order to make this possible, the production increase must automatically create an increase in money. Otherwise the dividend, while being perfectly justifiable, becomes impossible to give in practice.
In the example of the $5,000 that was used to buy ploughing implements, the lender is entitled to a share of the results, since production increased, thanks to his loan. If he accepts to be paid in goods, there is no problem. But if he wants to be paid in money, it is quite another story since, even if production increased, there was no corresponding increase in the money in circulation. The Social Credit system, which makes money come into being interest free, as new production is made, would settle this problem.
And for those who worry about the fate of the banks if they did not charge interest on their loans, let us just mention for now that the wages and salaries of their employees would be paid by the National Credit Office, the authority in charge of the creation of new money in the country. (This point is explained in detail in Louis Even's brochure: A Sound and Efficient Financial System.)
Just like Our Lord drove the money changers out of the Temple, it is high time we drove out the International Financiers and their debt-money system, and set up an honest debt-free money system — money issued by society. May this passage of the Gospel inspire us, and let us ask Christ to fill us with the same zeal as His for the interests of God and for justice.
United States Vice President Richard Cheney (a/k/a Dick Cheney)

1st Session
Resolved, That Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United States, is impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors, and that the following articles of impeachment be exhibited to the United States Senate:
Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives of the United States of America in the name of itself and of the people of the United States of America, against Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United States of America, in maintenance and support of its impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors.
29 August 2008
The Conservative Party of Canada

"The American Empire"


28 August 2008
Disbarred Manitoba Lawyer Deveryn Ross

by "Michael"
As originally posted on: The Blue Maple Leaf
May 27, 2005
Travis Smith is the author of The Smyth Report. He recently published an article on his website that gave details of Deveryn Ross’ 1995 criminal conviction for fraud. Deveryn Ross was a lawyer bofore being convicted, but has since been disbarred by the Law Society of Manitoba.
Deveryn Ross currently serves as the Riding Association president for the liberal party in Brandon-Souris. The point of the Travis Smyth article was that Mr. Ross portrays an excellent example of the types of people you will find in the Liberal party; those who care not for a greater cause, but who are willing to compromise good morals and values to achieve their goals.
Travis Smyth wrote, “I and many others tend to think this website does a fine job of portraying many Liberals as they truly are: corrupt, arrogant, wasteful, and mismanaging. Surely not every Liberal would fall into all of these categories, but I would bet that every Liberal falls into at least one.”
After publishing the article, Travis Smyth received an e-mail from Deveryn Ross. The e-mail included a comment you would expect from a washed up, disbarred lawyer. Deveryn Ross wrote:
“I sue people for fun and recreation, and can easily have a statement of claim filed against you by the close of business tomorrow. You have until then to delete your post, as well as all of the responses.”
What a wonderful life Deveryn Ross must live to be the president of a criminal party of Canada riding association, himself a convicted criminal and disbarred lawyer, who served jail time and sues people for fun and recreation.
27 August 2008
Disbarred Manitoba Lawyer Deveryn Ross
Case 96-11 DEVERYN DONALD ALEXANDER ROSS Called to the Bar Particulars of Charges Date of Hearing Panel R. Pollack, Q.C. A. Braid, Q.C. Disposition Counsel Member did not appear Conviction Under the Criminal Code Facts Mr. Ross was convicted on May 26, 1995, in the Queen's Bench, Brandon Centre, of two counts of fraud pursuant to Section 380(1)(a) of The Criminal Code of Canada. The nature of the fraud arose out of the construction, completion and ultimate collapse of a restaurant in Brandon in 1990 and 1991. Mr. Ross was convicted of defrauding one of his partners, and a number of the investors in the project. Mr. Ross was sentenced to eighteen months incarceration. The conviction and sentence were upheld in the Manitoba Court of Appeal. Decision and Comments After hearing a lengthy review of the facts, the Discipline Committee was satisfied that Mr. Ross had engaged in conduct unbecoming a barrister and solicitor. The Committee found that the facts disclosed a course of planned and deliberate conduct by Mr. Ross which was fraudulent over an extended period of time. The Committee was of the view that the facts showed dishonesty, a lack of integrity, and a complete lack of ethics by Mr. Ross in dealing with members of the general public. Penalty The Committee resolved that Mr. Ross be disbarred and his name struck from the Rolls of the Law Society as a barrister and solicitor. An order for costs in the amount of $1,500.00 was assessed. |
26 August 2008
"The Media Men"

Concurrence can no longer compete with dissent. One minute of Eldridge Cleaver is worth ten minutes of Roy Wilkins. The labor crisis settled at the negotiating table is nothing compared to the confrontation that results in a strike - or, better yet, violence along the picket line. Normality has become the nemesis of the evening news.
25 August 2008
Former Canadian Federal Member of Parliament Gurmant Grewal

24 August 2008
23 August 2008
Canadian Federal Member of Parliament / Fisheries Minister Loyola Hearn

by Myles Higgins
22 August 2008
Canada

21 August 2008
Nike, Inc.

March 21, 2007
20 August 2008
The United States Federal Reserve System

19 August 2008
Canadian Federal Member of Parliament Robert Thibault

18 August 2008
The People's Republic of China

17 August 2008
Past United States President Bill Clinton (a/k/a William Jefferson Clinton)

U.S. Supreme Court
No. 95-1853
WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PETITIONER v. PAULA CORBIN JONES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
[May 27, 1997]
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises a constitutional and a prudential question concerning the Office of the President of the United States. Respondent, a private citizen, seeks to recover damages from the current occupant of that office based on actions allegedly taken before his term began. The President submits that in all but the most exceptional cases the Constitution requires federal courts to defer such litigation until his term ends and that, in any event, respect for the office warrants such a stay. Despite the force of the arguments supporting the President's submissions, we conclude that they must be rejected.
Petitioner, William Jefferson Clinton, was elected to the Presidency in 1992, and re elected in 1996. His term of office expires on January 20, 2001. In 1991 he was the Governor of the State of Arkansas. Respondent, Paula Corbin Jones, is a resident of California. In 1991 she lived in Arkansas, and was an employee of the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission.
On May 6, 1994, she commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas by filing a complaint naming petitioner and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas State Police officer, as defendants. The complaint alleges two federal claims, and two state law claims over which the federal court has jurisdiction because of the diverse citizenship of the parties. 1 As the case comes to us, we are required to assume the truth of the detailed--but as yet untested-- factual allegations in the complaint.
Those allegations principally describe events that are said to have occurred on the afternoon of May 8, 1991, during an official conference held at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Governor delivered a speech at the conference; respondent - working as a state employee - staffed the registration desk. She alleges that Ferguson persuaded her to leave her desk and to visit the Governor in a business suite at the hotel, where he made "abhorrent" 2 sexual advances that she vehemently rejected. She further claims that her superiors at work subsequently dealt with her in a hostile and rude manner, and changed her duties to punish her for rejecting those advances. Finally, she alleges that after petitioner was elected President, Ferguson defamed her by making a statement to a reporter that implied she had accepted petitioner's alleged overtures, and that various persons authorized to speak for the President publicly branded her a liar by denying that the incident had occurred.
Respondent seeks actual damages of $75,000, and punitive damages of $100,000. Her complaint contains four counts. The first charges that petitioner, acting under color of state law, deprived her of rights protected by the Constitution, in violation of Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The second charges that petitioner andFerguson engaged in a conspiracy to violate her federal rights, also actionable under federal law. See Rev. Stat. 1980, 42 U.S.C. 1985. The third is a state common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, grounded primarily on the incident at the hotel. The fourth count, also based on state law, is for defamation, embracing both the comments allegedly made to the press by Ferguson and the statements of petitioner's agents. Inasmuch as the legal sufficiency of the claims has not yet been challenged, we assume, without deciding, that each of the four counts states a cause of action as a matter of law. With the exception of the last charge, which arguably may involve conduct within the outer perimeter of the President's official responsibilities, it is perfectly clear that the alleged misconduct of petitioner was unrelated to any of his official duties as President of the United States and, indeed, occurred before he was elected to that office. 3
In response to the complaint, petitioner promptly advised the District Court that he intended to file a motion to dismiss on grounds of Presidential immunity, and requested the court to defer all other pleadings and motions until after the immunity issue was resolved. 4 Relying on our cases holding that immunity questions should be decided at the earliest possible stage of the litigation, 858 F. Supp. 902, 905 (ED Ark. 1994), our recognition of the " 'singular importance of the President's duties,' " id., at 904 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 751 (1982)), and the fact that the question did not require any analysis of the allegations of the complaint, 858 F. Supp., at 905, the court granted the request. Petitioner thereupon filed a motion "to dismiss . . . without prejudice and to toll any statutes of limitation [that may be applicable] until he is no longer President, at which time the plaintiff may refile the instant suit." Record, Doc. No. 17. Extensive submissions were made to the District Court by the parties and the Department of Justice. 5
The District Judge denied the motion to dismiss on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery in the case could go forward, but ordered any trial stayed until the end of petitioner's Presidency. 869 F. Supp. 690 (ED Ark. 1994). Although she recognized that a "thin majority" in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), had held that "the President has absolute immunity from civil damage actions arising out of the execution of official duties of office," she was not convinced that "a President has absolute immunity from civil causes of action arising prior to assuming the office." 6 She was, however, persuaded by some of the reasoning in our opinion in Fitzgerald that deferring the trial if one were required would be appropriate. 7 869 F. Supp., at 699-700. Relying in part on the fact that respondent had failed to bring her complaint until two days beforethe 3 year period of limitations expired, she concluded that the public interest in avoiding litigation that might hamper the President in conducting the duties of his office outweighed any demonstrated need for an immediate trial. Id., at 698-699.
Both parties appealed. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, but because it regarded the order postponing the trial until the President leaves office as the "functional equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity, it reversed that order. 72 F. 3d 1354, 1361, n. 9, 1363 (CA8 1996). Writing for the majority, Judge Bowman explained that "the President, like all other government officials, is subject to the same laws that apply to all other members of our society," id., at 1358, that he could find no "case in which any public official ever has been granted any immunity from suit for his unofficial acts," ibid., and that the rationale for official immunity "is inapposite where only personal, private conduct by a President is at issue," id., at 1360. The majority specifically rejected the argument that, unless immunity is available, the threat of judicial interference with the Executive Branch through scheduling orders, potential contempt citations, and sanctions would violate separation of powers principles. Judge Bowman suggested that "judicial case management sensitive to the burdens of the presidency and the demands of the President's schedule," would avoid the perceived danger. Id., at 1361.
In dissent, Judge Ross submitted that even though the holding in Fitzgerald involved official acts, the logic of the opinion, which "placed primary reliance on the prospect that the President's discharge of his constitutional powers and duties would be impaired if he were subject to suits for damages," applies with equal force to this case. 72 F. 3d, at 1367. In his view, "unless exigent circumstances can be shown," all private actions for damages against a sitting President must be stayed until the completion of his term. Ibid. In this case, Judge Ross saw no reason why the stay would prevent respondent from ultimately obtaining an adjudication of her claims.
In response to the dissent, Judge Beam wrote a separate concurrence. He suggested that a prolonged delay may well create a significant risk of irreparable harm to respondent because of an unforeseeable loss of evidence or the possible death of a party. Id., at 1363-1364. Moreover, he argued that in civil rights cases brought under ?1983 there is a "public interest in an ordinary citizen's timely vindication of . . . her most fundamental rights against alleged abuse of power by government officials." Id., at 1365. In his view, the dissent's concern about judicial interference with the functioning of the Presidency was "greatly overstated." Ibid. Neither the involvement of prior presidents in litigation, either as parties or as witnesses, nor the character of this "relatively uncomplicated civil litigation," indicated that the threat was serious. Id., at 1365-1366. Finally, he saw "no basis for staying discovery or trial of the claims against Trooper Ferguson." Id., at 1366. 8
The President, represented by private counsel, filed a petition for certiorari. The Solicitor General, representing the United States, supported the petition, arguing that the decision of the Court of Appeals was "fundamentally mistaken" and created "serious risks for the institution of the Presidency." 9 In her brief in opposition to certiorari, respondent argued that this "one of a kind case is singularly inappropriate" for the exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction because it did not create any conflict among the Courts of Appeals, it "does not pose any conceivable threat to the functioning of the Executive Branch," and there is no precedent supporting the President's position. 10
While our decision to grant the petition expressed no judgment concerning the merits of the case, it does reflect our appraisal of its importance. The representations made on behalf of the Executive Branch as to the potential impact of the precedent established by the Court of Appeals merit our respectful and deliberate consideration.
It is true that we have often stressed the importance of avoiding the premature adjudication of constitutional questions. 11 That doctrine of avoidance, however, is applicable to the entire Federal Judiciary, not just to this Court, cf. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. ___ (1997), and comes into play after the court has acquired jurisdiction of a case. It does not dictatea discretionary denial of every certiorari petition raising a novel constitutional question. It does, however, make it appropriate to identify two important constitutional issues not encompassed within the questions presented by the petition for certiorari that we need not address today. 12
First, because the claim of immunity is asserted in a federal court and relies heavily on the doctrine of separation of powers that restrains each of the three branches of the Federal Government from encroaching on the domain of the other two, see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976), it is not necessary to consider or decide whether a comparable claim might succeed in a state tribunal. If this case were being heard in a state forum, instead of advancing a separation of powers argument, petitioner would presumably rely on federalism and comity concerns, 13 as well as the interest in protecting federal officials from possible local prejudice that underlies the authority to remove certain cases brought against federal officers from a state to a federal court, see 28 U.S.C. 1442(a); Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 125 -126 (1989). Whether those concerns would present a more compelling case for immunity is a question that is not before us.
Second, our decision rejecting the immunity claim and allowing the case to proceed does not require us to confront the question whether a court may compel the attendance of the President at any specific time or place. We assume that the testimony of the President, both for discovery and for use at trial, may be taken at the White House at a time that will accommodate his busy schedule, and that, if a trial is held, there would be no necessity for the President to attend in person, though he could elect to do so. 14
Petitioner's principal submission - that "in all but the most exceptional cases," Brief for Petitioner i, the Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office - cannot be sustained on the basis of precedent.
Only three sitting Presidents have been defendants in civil litigation involving their actions prior to taking office. Complaints against Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman had been dismissed before they took office; the dismissals were affirmed after their respective inaugurations. 15 Two companion cases arising out of an automobile accident were filed against John F. Kennedyin 1960 during the Presidential campaign. 16 After taking office, he unsuccessfully argued that his status as Commander in Chief gave him a right to a stay under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U. S. C. App. 501-525. The motion for a stay was denied by the District Court, and the matter was settled out of court. 17 Thus, none of those cases sheds any light on the constitutional issue before us.
The principal rationale for affording certain public servants immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct. In cases involving prosecutors, legislators, and judges we have repeatedly explained that the immunity serves the public interest in enabling such officials to perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability. 18 We explained in Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979):
"As public servants, the prosecutor and the judge represent the interest of society as a whole. The conduct of their official duties may adversely affect a wide variety of different individuals, each of whom may be a potential source of future controversy. The societal interest in providing such public officials with the maximum ability to deal fearlesslyand impartially with the public at large has long been recognized as an acceptable justification for official immunity. The point of immunity for such officials is to forestall an atmosphere of intimidation that would conflict with their resolve to perform their designated functions in a principled fashion." Id., at 202-204.
This reasoning provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. As we explained in Fitzgerald, "the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity's justifying purposes." Id., at 755. Because of the President's broad responsibilities, werecognized in that case an immunity from damages claims arising out of official acts extending to the "outer perimeter of his authority." Id., at 757. But we have never suggested that the President, or any other official, has an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity. See id., at 759 (Burger, C. J., concurring) (noting that "a President, like Members of Congress, judges, prosecutors, or congressional aides - all having absolute immunity - are not immune for acts outside official duties"); see also id., at 761, n. 4.
Moreover, when defining the scope of an immunity for acts clearly taken within an official capacity, we have applied a functional approach. "Frequently our decisions have held that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office." Id., at 755. Hence, for example, a judge's absolute immunity does not extend to actions performed in a purely administrative capacity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 -230 (1988). As our opinions have made clear, immunities are grounded in "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it." Id., at 229.
Petitioner's effort to construct an immunity from suit for unofficial acts grounded purely in the identity of his office is unsupported by precedent.
We are also unpersuaded by the evidence from the historical record to which petitioner has called our attention. He points to a comment by Thomas Jefferson protesting the subpoena duces tecum Chief Justice Marshall directed to him in the Burr trial, 20 a statement in the diaries kept by Senator William Maclay of the first Senate debates, in which then Vice President John Adams and Senator Oliver Ellsworth are recorded as having said that "the President personally [is] not . . . subject to any process whatever," lest it be "put . . . in the power of a common Justice to exercise any Authority over him and Stop the Whole Machine of Government," 21 and to a quotation from Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution. 22 None of these sources sheds much light on the question at hand. 23
Respondent, in turn, has called our attention to conflicting historical evidence. Speaking in favor of the Constitution's adoption at the Pennsylvania Convention, James Wilson - who had participated in the Philadelphia Convention at which the document was drafted - explained that, although the President "is placed [on] high," "not a single privilege is annexed to his character; far from being above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character as a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment." 2 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 480 (2d ed. 1863) (emphasis omitted). This description is consistent with both the doctrine of presidential immunity as set forth in Fitzgerald, and rejection of the immunity claim in this case. With respect to acts taken in his "public character" - that is official acts - the President may be disciplined principally by impeachment, not by private lawsuits for damages. But he is otherwise subject to the laws for his purely private acts.
In the end, as applied to the particular question before us, we reach the same conclusion about these historical materials that Justice Jackson described when confronted with an issue concerning the dimensions of the President's power. "Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharoah. A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each side . . . . They largely canceleach other." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 -635 (1952) (concurring opinion).
Petitioner's strongest argument supporting his immunity claim is based on the text and structure of the Constitution. He does not contend that the occupant of the Office of the President is "above the law," in the sense that his conduct is entirely immune from judicial scrutiny. 24 The President argues merely for a postponement of the judicial proceedings that will determine whether he violated any law. His argument is grounded in the character of the office that was created by Article II of the Constitution, and relies on separation of powers principles that have structured our constitutional arrangement since the founding.
As a starting premise, petitioner contends that he occupies a unique office with powers and responsibilities so vast and important that the public interest demands that he devote his undivided time and attention to his public duties. He submits that - given the nature of the office - the doctrine of separation of powers places limits on the authority of the Federal Judiciary to interfere with the Executive Branch that would be transgressed by allowing this action to proceed.
We have no dispute with the initial premise of the argument. Former presidents, from George Washingtonto George Bush, have consistently endorsed petitioner's characterization of the office. 25 After serving his term, Lyndon Johnson observed: "Of all the 1,886 nights I was President, there were not many when I got to sleep before 1 or 2 a.m., and there were few mornings when I didn't wake up by 6 or 6:30." 26 In 1967, the Twenty fifth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted to ensure continuity in the performance of the powers and duties of the office; 27 one of the sponsors of that Amendment stressed the importance of providing that "at all times" there be a President "who has complete control and will be able to perform" those duties. 28 As Justice Jackson has pointed out, the Presidency concentrates executive authority "in a single head in whose choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of public hopes and expectations. In drama, magnitude and finality his decisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the public eye and ear." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S., at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring). We have, in short, long recognized the "unique position in the constitutional scheme" that this office occupies. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 749 . 29 Thus, while we suspect that even in our modern era there remains some truth to Chief Justice Marshall's suggestion that the duties of the Presidency are not entirely "unremitting," United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (CC Va. 1807), we accept the initial premise of the Executive's argument.
It does not follow, however, that separation of powers principles would be violated by allowing this action to proceed. The doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the allocation of official power among the three co equal branches of our Government. The Framers "built into the tripartite Federal Government . . . a self executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 122 . 30 Thus, for example, the Congress may not exercise the judicial power to revise final judgments, Plaut v. SpendthriftFarm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), 31 or the executive power to manage an airport, see Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 276 (1991) (holding that "[i]f the power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it"). 32 See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (Congress may not "invest itself or its members with either executive power or judicial power"). Similarly, the President may not exercise the legislative power to authorize the seizure of private property for public use. Youngstown, 343 U.S., at 588 . And, the judicial power to decide cases and controversies does not include the provision of purely advisory opinions to the Executive, 33 or permit the federal courts to resolve nonjusticiable questions. 34
Of course the lines between the powers of the three branches are not always neatly defined. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 -381 (1989). 35 But in this case there is no suggestion that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as "executive." Respondent is merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies. Whatever the outcome of this case, there is no possibility that the decision will curtail the scope of the official powers of the Executive Branch. The litigation of questions that relate entirely to the unofficial conduct of the individual who happens to be the President poses no perceptible risk of misallocation of either judicial power or executive power.
Rather than arguing that the decision of the case will produce either an aggrandizement of judicial power or a narrowing of executive power, petitioner contends that - as a by product of an otherwise traditional exercise of judicial power - burdens will be placed on the President that will hamper the performance of his official duties. We have recognized that "[e]ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself . . . the separation of powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties." Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. ___, ___ (1996) (slip op., at 8); see also Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). As a factual matter, petitioner contends that this particular case - as well as the potential additional litigation that an affirmance of the Court of Appeals judgment might spawn - may impose an unacceptable burden on the President's time and energy, and thereby impair the effective performance of his office.
Petitioner's predictive judgment finds little support in either history or the relatively narrow compass of the issues raised in this particular case. As we have already noted, in the more than 200 year history of the Republic, only three sitting Presidents have been subjected to suits for their private actions. 36 See supra, at 9-10. If the past is any indicator, it seems unlikely that a deluge of such litigation will ever engulf the Presidency. As for the case at hand, if properly managed by the District Court, it appears to us highly unlikely to occupy any substantial amount of petitioner's time.
Of greater significance, petitioner errs by presuming that interactions between the Judicial Branch and the Executive, even quite burdensome interactions, necessarily rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive's ability to perform its constitutionally mandated functions. "[O]ur . . . system imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence the absence of which `would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.' " Mistretta, 488 U.S., at 381 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S., at 121 ). As Madison explained, separation of powers does not mean that the branches "ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other." 37 The fact that a federal court's exercise of its traditional Article III jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief Executive is not sufficient to establish a violation of the Constitution. Two long settled propositions, first announced by Chief Justice Marshall, support that conclusion.
First, we have long held that when the President takes official action, the Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the law. Perhaps the most dramatic example of such a case is our holding that President Truman exceeded his constitutional authority when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation's steel mills in order to avert a national catastrophe. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Despite the serious impact of that decision on the ability of the Executive Branch to accomplish its assigned mission, and the substantial time that the President must necessarily have devoted to the matter as a result of judicial involvement, we exercised our Article III jurisdiction todecide whether his official conduct conformed to the law. Our holding was an application of the principle established in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id., at 177.
Second, it is also settled that the President is subject to judicial process in appropriate circumstances. Although Thomas Jefferson apparently thought otherwise, Chief Justice Marshall, when presiding in the treason trial of Aaron Burr, ruled that a subpoena duces tecum could be directed to the President. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807). 38 We unequivocally and emphatically endorsed Marshall's position when we held that President Nixon was obligated to comply with a subpoena commanding him to produce certain tape recordings of his conversations with his aides. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). As we explained, "neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances." Id., at 706. 39
Sitting Presidents have responded to court orders to provide testimony and other information with sufficient frequency that such interactions between the Judicial and Executive Branches can scarcely be thought a novelty. President Monroe responded to written interrogatories, see Rotunda, Presidents and Ex Presidents as Witnesses: A Brief Historical Footnote, 1975 U. Ill. L. F. 1, 5-6, President Nixon - as noted above - produced tapes in response to a subpoena duces tecum, see United States v. Nixon, President Ford complied with an order to give a deposition in a criminal trial, United States v. Fromme, 405 F. Supp. 578 (ED Cal. 1975), and President Clinton has twice given videotaped testimony in criminal proceedings, see United States v. McDougal, 934 F. Supp. 296 (ED Ark. 1996); United States v. Branscum, No., LRP-CR%96-49 (ED Ark., June 7, 1996). Moreover, sitting Presidents have also voluntarily complied with judicial requests for testimony. President Grant gave a lengthy deposition in a criminal case under such circumstances, R. Rotunda & J. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law 7.1 (2d ed. 1992), and President Carter similarly gave videotaped testimony for use at a criminal trial, ibid.
In sum, "[i]t is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the United States." Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 753 -754. If the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President's official conduct, and if it may direct appropriate process to the President himself, it must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of his unofficial conduct. The burden on the President's time and energy that is a mere by product of such review surely cannot be considered as onerous as the direct burden imposed by judicial review and the occasional invalidation of his official actions. 40 We therefore hold that the doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office.
The reasons for rejecting such a categorical rule apply as well to a rule that would require a stay "in all but the most exceptional cases." Brief for Petitioner i. Indeed, if the Framers of the Constitution had thought it necessary to protect the President from the burdens of private litigation, we think it far more likely that they would have adopted a categorical rule than a rule that required the President to litigate the question whether a specific case belonged in the "exceptional case" subcategory. In all events, the question whether a specific case should receive exceptional treatment is more appropriately the subject of the exercise of judicial discretion than an interpretation of the Constitution. Accordingly, we turn to the question whether the District Court's decision to stay the trial until after petitioner leaves office was an abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals described the District Court's discretionary decision to stay the trial as the "functional equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity. 72 F. 3d, at 1361, n. 9. Concluding that petitioner was not constitutionally entitled to such an immunity, the court held that it was error to grant the stay. Ibid. Although we ultimately conclude that the stay should not have been granted, we think the issue is more difficult than the opinion of the Court of Appeals suggests.
Strictly speaking the stay was not the functional equivalent of the constitutional immunity that petitioner claimed, because the District Court ordered discovery to proceed. Moreover, a stay of either the trial or discovery might be justified by considerations that do not require the recognition of any constitutional immunity. The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket. See, e.g., Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). As we have explained, "[e]specially in cases of extraordinary public moment, [a plaintiff] may be required to submit to delay not immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its consequences if the public welfare or convenience will thereby be promoted." Id., at 256. Although we have rejected the argument that the potential burdens on the President violate separation of powers principles, those burdens are appropriate matters for the District Court to evaluate in its management of the case. The high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive, though not justifying a rule of categorical immunity, is a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the timing and scope of discovery. 41
Nevertheless, we are persuaded that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to defer the trial until after the President leaves office. Such a lengthy and categorical stay takes no account whatever of the respondent's interest in bringing the case to trial. The complaint was filed within the statutory limitations period - albeit near the end of that period - and delaying trial would increase the danger of prejudice resulting from the loss of evidence, including the inability of witnesses to recall specific facts, or the possible death of a party.
The decision to postpone the trial was, furthermore, premature. The proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need. Id., at 255. In this case, at the stage at which the District Court made its ruling, there was no way to assess whether a stay of trial after the completion of discovery would be warranted. Other than the fact that a trial may consume some of the President's time and attention, there is nothing in the record to enable a judge to assess the potential harm that may ensue from scheduling the trial promptly after discovery is concluded. We think the District Courtmay have given undue weight to the concern that a trial might generate unrelated civil actions that could conceivably hamper the President in conducting the duties of his office. If and when that should occur, the court's discretion would permit it to manage those actions in such fashion (including deferral of trial) that interference with the President's duties would not occur. But no such impingement upon the President's conduct of his office was shown here.
We add a final comment on two matters that are discussed at length in the briefs: the risk that our decision will generate a large volume of politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation, and the danger that national security concerns might prevent the President from explaining a legitimate need for a continuance.
We are not persuaded that either of these risks is serious. Most frivolous and vexatious litigation is terminated at the pleading stage or on summary judgment, with little if any personal involvement by the defendant. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12, 56. Moreover, the availability of sanctions provides a significant deterrent to litigation directed at the President in his unofficial capacity for purposes of political gain or harassment. 42 History indicates that the likelihood that a significant number of such cases will be filed is remote. Although scheduling problems may arise, there is no reason to assume that the District Courts will be either unable to accommodate the President's needs or unfaithful to the tradition - especially in matters involving national security - of giving "the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities." 43 Several Presidents, including petitioner, have given testimony without jeopardizing the Nation's security. See supra, at 23. In short, we have confidence in the ability of our federal judges to deal with both of these concerns.
If Congress deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger protection, it may respond with appropriate legislation. As petitioner notes in his brief, Congress has enacted more than one statute providing for the deferral of civil litigation to accommodate important public interests. Brief for Petitioner 34-36. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. ? 362 (litigation against debtor stayed upon filing of bankruptcy petition); Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U. S. C. App. ??501-525 (provisions governing, inter alia, tolling or stay of civil claims by or against military personnel during course of active duty). If the Constitution embodied the rule that the President advocates, Congress, of course, could not repeal it. But our holding today raises no barrier to a statutory response to these concerns.
The Federal District Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Like every other citizen who properly invokes that jurisdiction, respondent has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
FOOTNOTES
[ Footnote 1 ] See 28 U.S.C. 1332. Jurisdiction over the federal claims is authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343.
[ Footnote 2 ] Complaint 26.
[ Footnote 3 ] As the matter is not before us, see Jones v. Clinton, 72 F. 3d 1354, 1359, n. 7 (CA8 1996), we do not address the question whether the President's immunity from damages liability for acts taken within the "outer perimeter" of his official responsibilities provides a defense to the fourth count of the complaint. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982).
[ Footnote 4 ] Record, Doc. No. 9; see 858 F. Supp. 902, 904 (ED Ark. 1994).
[ Footnote 5 ] See App. to Pet. for Cert. 53.
[ Footnote 6 ] 869 F. Supp., at 698. She explained: "Nowhere in the Constitution, congressional acts, or the writings of any judge or scholar, may any credible support for such a proposition be found. It is contrary to our form of government, which asserts as did the English in the Magna Carta and the Petition of Right, that even the sovereign is subject to God and the law." Ibid.
[ Footnote 7 ] Although, as noted above, the District Court's initial order permitted discovery to go forward, the court later stayed discovery pending the outcome of the appeals on the immunity issue. 879 F. Supp. 86 (ED Ark. 1995).
[ Footnote 8 ] Over the dissent of Judge McMillian, the Court of Appeals denied a suggestion for rehearing en banc. 81 F. 3d 78 (CA8 1996).
[ Footnote 9 ] Brief for United States in Support of Petition 5.
[ Footnote 10 ] Brief in Opposition 8, 10, 23.
[ Footnote 11 ] As we have explained: " `If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.' Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 [(1944)]. It has long been the Court's `considered practice not to decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions . . . or to decide any constitutional question in advance of the necessity for its decision . . . or to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied . . . or to decide any constitutional question except with reference to the particular facts to which it is to be applied . . . .' Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 [(1945)]. `It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.' Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 [(1905)]." Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 570 , n. 34 (1947).
[ Footnote 12 ] The two questions presented in the certiorari petition are: "1. Whether the litigation of a private civil damages action against an incumbent President must in all but the most exceptional cases be deferred until the President leaves office"; and "2. Whether a district court, as a proper exercise of judicial discretion, may stay such litigation until the President leaves office." Our review is confined to these issues. See this Court's Rule 14.1(a).
[ Footnote 13 ] Because the Supremacy Clause makes federal law "the supreme Law of the Land," Art. VI, cl. 2, any direct control by a state court over the President, who has principal responsibility to ensure that those laws are "faithfully executed," Art. II, 3, may implicate concerns that are quite different from the interbranch separation of powers questions addressed here. Cf., e.g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178 -179 (1976); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943). See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 513 (2d ed. 1988) ("absent explicit congressional consent no state may command federal officials . . . to take action in derogation of their . . . federal responsibilities").
[ Footnote 14 ] Although Presidents have responded to written interrogatories, given depositions, and provided videotaped trial testimony, see infra, at 23, no sitting President has ever testified, or been ordered to testify, in open court.
[ Footnote 15 ] See People ex rel. Hurley v. Roosevelt, 179 N. Y. 544, 71 N. E. 1137 (1904); DeVault v. Truman, 354 Mo. 1193, 194 S. W. 2d 29 (1946).
[ Footnote 16 ] See Bailey v. Kennedy, No. 757,200 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1960); Hills v. Kennedy, No. 757,201 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1960).
[ Footnote 17 ] See 72 F. 3d, at 1362, n. 10.
[ Footnote 18 ] Some of these cases defined the immunities of state and local officials in actions filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422 -423 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 -377 (1951) (legislative immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 -555 (1967) (judicial immunity). The rationale underlying our official immunity jurisprudence in cases alleging constitutional violations brought against federal officials is similar. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500 -501 (1978).
[ Footnote 19 ] Petitioner draws our attention to dicta in Fitzgerald, which he suggests are helpful to his cause. We noted there that "[b]ecause of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government," 457 U.S., at 751 , and suggested further that "[c]ognizance of . . . personal vulnerability frequently could distract a President from his public duties," id., at 753. Petitioner argues that in this aspect the Court's concern was parallel to the issue he suggests is of great importance in this case, the possibility that a sitting President might be distracted by the need to participate in litigation during the pendency of his office. In context, however, it is clear that our dominant concern was with the diversion of the President's attention during the decisionmaking process caused by needless worry as to the possibility of damages actions stemming from any particular official decision. Moreover, Fitzgerald did not present the issue raised in this case because that decision involved claims against a former President.
[ Footnote 20 ] In Jefferson's view, the subpoena jeopardized the separation of powers by subjecting the Executive Branch to judicial command. See 10 Works of Thomas Jefferson 404, n. (P. Ford ed. 1905); Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 751 , n. 31 (quoting Jefferson's comments).
[ Footnote 21 ] 9 Documentary History of First Federal Congress of the United States 168 (K. Bowling & H. Veit eds., 1988) (Diary of William Maclay).
[ Footnote 22 ] See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 1563, pp. 418-419 (1833).
[ Footnote 23 ] Jefferson's argument provides little support for respondent's position. As we explain later, the prerogative Jefferson claimed was denied him by the Chief Justice in the very decision Jefferson was protesting, and this Court has subsequently reaffirmed that holding. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). The statements supporting a similar proposition recorded in Senator Maclay's diary are inconclusive of the issue before us here for the same reason. In addition, this material is hardly proof of the unequivocal common understanding at the time of the founding. Immediately after mentioning the positions of Adams and Ellsworth, Maclay went on to point out in his diary that he virulently disagreed with them, concluding that his opponents' view "[s]hows clearly how amazingly fond of the old leven many People are." Diary of Maclay 168. Finally, Justice Story's comments in his constitutional law treatise provide no substantial support for respondent's position. Story wrote that because the President's "incidental powers" must include "the power to perform [his duties], without any obstruction," he "cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability." 3 Story, ?1563, at 418-419 (emphasis added). Story said only that "an official inviolability," ibid. (emphasis added), was necessary to preserve the President's ability to perform the functions of the office; he did not specify the dimensions of the necessary immunity. While we have held that an immunity from suits grounded on official acts is necessary to serve this purpose, see Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 749 , it does not follow that the broad immunity from all civil damages suits that petitioner seeks is also necessary.
[ Footnote 24 ] For that reason, the argument does not place any reliance on the English ancestry that informs our common law jurisprudence; he does not claim the prerogatives of the monarchs who asserted that "[t]he King can do no wrong." See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *246. Although we have adopted the related doctrine of sovereign immunity, the common law fiction that "[t]he king . . . is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong," ibid., was rejected at the birth of the Republic. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 , and nn. 7-8 (1970); Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 342 -343 (1880).
[ Footnote 25 ] See, e.g., A. Tourtellot, The Presidents on the Presidency 346-374 (1964) (citing comments of, among others, George Washington, John Quincy Adams, Benjamin Harrison, Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson); H. Finer, The Presidency: Crisis and Regeneration 35-37 (1960) (citing similar remarks by a number of Presidents, including James Monroe, James K. Polk, and Harry Truman).
[ Footnote 26 ] L. Johnson, The Vantage Point 425 (1971).
[ Footnote 27 ] The Amendment sets forth, inter alia, an elaborate procedure for Presidential succession in the event that the Chief Executive becomes incapacitated. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 25, 3-4.
[ Footnote 28 ] 111 Cong. Rec. 15595 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
[ Footnote 29 ] We noted in Fitzgerald: "Article II, 1, of the Constitution provides that '[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President ofthe United States . . . .' This grant of authority establishes the President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the enforcement of federal law - it is the President who is charged constitutionally to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed'; the conduct of foreign affairs - a realm in which the Court has recognized that '[i]t would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret'; and management of the Executive Branch--a task for which `imperative reasons requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties.' " 457 U.S., at 749 -750 (footnotes omitted).
[ Footnote 30 ] See Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. ___, ___ (1996) (slip op., at 6-7); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) ("concern of encroachment and aggrandizement . . . has animated our separation of powers jurisprudence"); The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others").
[ Footnote 31 ] See also United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 147 (1872) (noting that Congress had "inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power").
[ Footnote 32 ] See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) ("structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws"). Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 -203 (1928).
[ Footnote 33 ] See United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40 (1852); Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792). As we explained in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948), "[t]his Court early and wisely determined that it would not give advisory opinions even when asked by the Chief Executive." More generally, "we have broadly stated that 'executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution.' " Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976)). These restrictions on judicial activities "help ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch and to prevent the Judiciary from encroaching into areas reserved for the other branches." 487 U.S., at 678 ; see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989).
[ Footnote 34 ] We have long held that the federal courts may not resolve such matters. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849). As we explained in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), "[a] controversy is nonjusticiable - i.e., involves a political question--where there is a 'textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it . . . .' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). But the courts must, in the first instance, interpret the text in question and determine whether and to what extent the issue is textually committed. See ibid.; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 (1969)." Id., at 228.
[ Footnote 35 ] See also Olson, 487 U.S., at 693 -694; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
[ Footnote 36 ] In Fitzgerald, we were able to discount the lack of historical support for the proposition that official capacity actions against the President posed a serious threat to the office on the ground that a right to sue federal officials for damages as a result of constitutional violations had only recently been recognized. See Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 753 , n. 33; Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The situation with respect to suits against the President for actions taken in his private capacity is quite different because such suits may be grounded on legal theories that have always been applicable to any potential defendant. Moreover, because the President has contact with far fewer people in his private life than in his official capacity, the class of potential plaintiffs is considerably smaller and the risk of litigation less intense.
[ Footnote 37 ] The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). See Mistretta, 488 U.S., at 381 ; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S., at 442 , n. 5.
[ Footnote 38 ] After the decision was rendered, Jefferson expressed his distress in a letter to a prosecutor at the trial, noting that "[t]he Constitution enjoins [the President's] constant agency in the concerns of 6. millions of people." 10 Works of Thomas Jefferson 404, n. (P. Ford ed. 1905). He asked, "[i]s the law paramount to this, which calls on him on behalf of a single one?" Ibid.; see also Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 751 -752, n. 31 (quoting Jefferson's comments at length). For Chief Justice Marshall, the answer - quite plainly - was yes.
[ Footnote 39 ] Of course, it does not follow that a court may " 'proceed against the president as against an ordinary individual,' " United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 715 (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 192 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807)). Special caution is appropriate if the materials or testimony sought by the court relate to a President's official activities, with respect to which "[t]he interest inpreserving confidentiality is weighty indeed and entitled to great respect." 418 U.S., at 712 . We have made clear that in a criminal case the powerful interest in the "fair administration of criminal justice" requires that the evidence be given under appropriate circumstances lest the "very integrity of the judicial system" be eroded. Id., at 709, 711-712.
[ Footnote 40 ] There is, no doubt, some truth to Learned Hand's comment that a lawsuit should be "dread[ed] . . . beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death." 3 Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Lectures on Legal Topics 105 (1926). We recognize that a President, like any other official or private citizen, may become distracted or preoccupied by pending litigation. Presidents and other officials face a variety of demands on their time, however, some private, some political, and some as a result of official duty. While such distractions may be vexing to those subjected to them, they do not ordinarily implicate constitutional separation of powers concerns.
[ Footnote 41 ] Although these claims are in fact analytically distinct, the District Court does not appear to have drawn that distinction. Rather than basing its decision on particular factual findings that might have buttressed an exercise of discretion, the District Court instead suggested that a discretionary stay was supported by the legal conclusion that such a stay was required by Fitzgerald. See 869 F. Supp., at 699. We therefore reject petitioner's argument that we lack jurisdiction over respondent's cross appeal from the District Court's alternative holding that its decision was "also permitted," inter alia, "under the equity powers of the Court." Ibid. The Court of Appeals correctly found that pendant appellate jurisdiction over this issue was proper. See 72 F. 3d, at 1357, n. 4. The District Court's legal ruling that the President was protected by a temporary immunity from trial - but not discovery - was "inextricably intertwined," Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995), with its suggestion that a discretionary stay having the same effect might be proper; indeed, "review of the [latter] decision [is] necessary to ensure meaningful review of the [former]," ibid.
[ Footnote 42 ] See, e.g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11; 28 U.S.C. 1927; Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (noting that "if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power" in imposing appropriate sanctions). Those sanctions may be set at a level "sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11(c)(2). As Rule 11 indicates, sanctions may be appropriate where a claim is "presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass," including any claim based on "allegations and other factual contentions [lacking] evidentiary support" or unlikely to prove well grounded after reasonable investigation. Rules 11(b)(1), (3).
[ Footnote 43 ] United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 710 -711; see also Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 753 ("Courts traditionally have recognized the President's constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counseling judicial deference and restraint").
15 August 2008
"The State-Banking Alliance" and "the Present International Order"

Banking, Nation States, and International Politics: A Sociological Reconstruction of the Present Economic Order
by Hans-Hermann Hoppe
The following essay is reprinted, with permission from the Ludwig von Mises Institute, from The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy [1993], 2nd ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006), pp. 77 - 116. It has been edited from its original formatting.
I. MONEY AND BANKING
In order to explain the emergence of barter, nothing more than the assumption of a narrowly defined self-interest is required. Insofar as man prefers more choices and goods to fewer, he will choose barter and division of labor over self-sufficiency.
The emergence of money from barter follows from the same narrow self-interest, if man is integrated in a barter economy and prefers a higher to a lower standard of living, he will choose to select and support a common medium of exchange. In selecting a money he can overcome the fundamental restriction imposed on exchange by a barter economy, i.e., that of requiring the existence of a double coincidence of wants. With money his possibilities for exchange widen. Every good becomes exchangeable for every other, independent of double coincidences or imperfect divisibilities. And with this widened exchangeability the value of each and every good in his possession increases.
If as man is integrated in an exchange economy, self-interest compels him to look out for particularly marketable goods which have desirable money properties such as divisibility, durability, recognizability, portability and scarcity, and to demand such goods not for their own sake but for the sake of employing them as media of exchange. And it is in his self-interest to choose that commodity as his medium of exchange that is also used as such most commonly by others. In fact, it is the function of money to facilitate exchange, to widen the range of exchange possibilities, and to thereby increase the value of one’s goods (to the extent that they are perceived as integrated in an exchange economy). Thus, the more widely a commodity is used as money, the better it will perform its monetary function. Driven by no more than narrow self-interest, man will always prefer a more general and, if possible, a universal medium of exchange to a less general or nonuniversal one. For the more common the money, the wider the market in which one is integrated, the more rational one’s value and cost calculations (from the viewpoint of someone desiring economic integration and wealth maximization), and the greater the benefits that one can reap from division of labor.[1]
Empirically, of course, the commodity that was once chosen as the best-because-most-universal-money is gold. Without government coercion gold would again be selected for the foreseeable future as the commodity best performing the function of money. Self-interest would lead everyone to prefer gold—as a universally used medium of exchange—to any other money. To the extent that every individual perceives himself and his possessions as integrated into an exchange economy, he would prefer accounting in terms of gold rather than in terms of any other money, because gold’s universal acceptance makes such accounting the most complete expression of one’s opportunity costs, and hence serves as the best guide in one’s attempts to maximize wealth. All other monies would be driven out of use quickly, because anything less than a strictly universal and international money such as gold—national or regional monies, that is—would contradict the very purpose of having money in the first place. Money has been invented by self-interested man in order to increase his wealth by integrating himself into an ever-widening and ultimately universal market. In the way of the pursuit of self-interest, national or regional monies would quickly be out-competed and supplanted by gold, because only gold makes economic integration complete and markets worldwide, thereby fulfilling the ultimate function of money as a common medium of exchange.[2]
The emergence of money, of increasingly better monies, and finally of one universal money, gold, sets productive energies free that previously remained frustrated and idle due to double-coincidence-of-wants-restrictions in the process of exchanges (such as the existence of competing monies with freely fluctuating exchange rates). Under barter the market for a producer’s output is restricted to instances of double want coincidences. With all prices expressed in terms of gold the producers market is oft-encompassing, and demand takes effect unrestricted by any absence of double coincidences on a worldwide scale. Accordingly, production increases—and increases more with gold than with any other money. With increased production the value of money in turn rises; and the higher purchasing power of money reduces one’s reservation demand for it, lowers one’s effective rate of time preference (the originary rate of interest), and leads to increased capital formation. An upward spiraling process of economic development is set in motion.
This development creates the basis for the emergence of banks as specialized money-handling institutions. On the one hand, banks come forward to meet the increasing demand for the safekeeping, transporting, and clearing of money. On the other hand, they fulfill the increasingly important function of facilitating exchanges between capitalists (savers) and entrepreneurs (investors), actually making an almost complete division of labor between these roles possible. As institutions of deposit and in particular as savings and credit institutions, banks quickly assume the rank of nerve centers of an economy. Increasingly the spatial and temporal allocation and coordination of economic resources and activities takes place through the mediation of banks; and in facilitating such coordination the emergence of banks implies still another stimulus for economic growth.[3]
While it is in everyone’s economic interest that there be only one universal money and only one unit of account, and man in his pursuit of wealth maximization will not stop until this goal is reached, it is contrary to such interest that there be only one bank or one monopolistic banking system. Rather, self-interest commands that every bank use the same universal money—gold—and that there then be no competition between different monies, but that free competition between banks and banking systems, all of which use gold, must exist. Only so long as free entry into banking exists will there be cost efficiency in this as in any other business; yet only as long as this competition concerns services rendered in terms of one and the same money commodity will free banking actually be able to fulfill the very function of money and banking, i.e., of facilitating economic integration rather than disintegration, of widening the market and expanding the division of labor rather than restricting them, of making value and cost accounting more rather than less rational, and hence of increasing rather than decreasing economic wealth. The notion of competition between monies is a contradiction in adjecto. Strictly speaking, a monetary system with rival monies of freely fluctuating exchange rates is still a system of (partial) barter, riddled with the problem of requiring double coincidences of wants in order for (some) exchanges to take place. The existence of such a system is dysfunctional of the very purpose of money.[4] Freely pursuing his own self-interest, man would immediately abandon it—and it would be a fundamental misconception regarding the essence of money to think of the free market not only in terms of competing banks but also in terms of competitive monies.[5] Competitive monies are not the outcome of free market actions but are invariably the result of coercion, of government imposed obstacles placed in the path of rational economic conduct.
With free banking based on a universal gold standard emerging, the goal of achieving the most cost efficient solution to coordinating and facilitating interspatial and intertemporal exchanges within the framework of a universally integrated market is accomplished. Prices for the service of safekeeping, transporting and clearing money, as well as for advancing money in time-contracts would drop to their lowest possible levels under a regime of free entry. And since these prices would be expressed in terms of one universal money, they would truly reflect the minimum costs of providing market-integrative services.
Moreover, bank competition combined with the fact that money must emerge as a commodity—such as gold—which in addition to its value as money has a commodity value and thus cannot be produced without significant cost-expenditure, also provides the best possible safeguard against fraudulent banking.
As money depositing institutions, banks—much like other institutions depositing fungible commodities yet more so in the case of banks because of the special role of the commodity money—are tempted to issue “fake” warehouse receipts, i.e., notes of deposit not covered by real money, as soon as such banknotes have assumed the role of money substitutes and are treated by market participants as unquestionable equivalents of actually deposited real money. In this situation, by issuing fake or fiat banknotes that physically cannot be distinguished from genuine money substitutes, a bank can—fraudulently and at another’s expense—increase its own wealth. It can directly purchase goods with such fake notes and thus enrich itself in the same way as any simple counterfeiter does. The bank’s real wealth and the wealth of the early recipients of the money increases through these purchases, and at the same time and by the same action the wealth of those receiving the new money late or not at all decreases, due to the inflationary consequences of counterfeiting. Or a bank can use such fiat money to expand its credit and earn interest on it. Once again a fraudulent income and wealth redistribution in the bank’s favor takes place.[6] Yet in addition, this time a boom-bust cycle is also set in motion: Placed at a lowered interest rate, the newly granted credit causes increased investments and initially creates a boom that cannot be distinguished from an economic expansion; however, this boom must turn bust because the credit that stimulated it does not represent real savings but instead was created out of thin air. Hence, with the entire new and expanded investment structure under way, a lack of capital must arise that makes the successful completion of all investment projects systematically impossible and instead requires a contraction with a liquidation of previous malinvestments.[7]
Under the gold standard any bank or banking system (including a monopolist one) would be constrained in its own inclination to succumb to such temptations by two requirements essential for successful counterfeiting. On the one hand, the banking public must not be suspicious of the trustworthiness of the bank—that is, its anti-fraud vigilance must be low for otherwise a bank run would quickly reveal the committed fraud. On the other hand, the bank cannot inflate its notes at such a pace that the public loses confidence in the notes’ purchasing power, reduces its reservation demand for them and flees instead towards “real” values, including real money, and thereby drives the counterfeiter into bankruptcy. Under a system of free banking, however, with no legal tender laws and gold as money, an additional constraint on potential bank fraud arises, for then every bank is faced with the existence of nonclients or clients of different banks. If in this situation additional counterfeit money is brought into circulation by a bank, it must invariably reckon with the fact that the money may end up in nonclients’ hands who demand immediate redemption, which the bank then would be unable to grant without at least a painful credit contraction. In fact, such a corrective contraction could only be avoided if the additional fiat money were to go exclusively into the cash reserves of the bank’s own clients and were used by them exclusively for transactions with other clients. Yet since a bank would have no way of knowing whether or not such a specific outcome could be achieved, or how to achieve it, the threat of a following credit contraction would act as an inescapable economic deterrent to any bank fraud.[8]
II. THE STATE AND THE MONOPOLIZATION OF MONEY AND BANKING
The present economic order is characterized by national monies instead of one universal money; by fiat money instead of a commodity such as gold; by monopolistic central banking instead of free banking; and by permanent bank fraud, and steadily repeated income and wealth redistribution, permanent inflation and recurring business cycles as its economic counterparts, rather than 100-percent-reserve banking with none of these consequences.
In complete contradiction, then, to man’s self-interest of maximizing wealth through economic integration, different antieconomic interests prevailing over economic ones must be responsible for the emergence of the contemporary monetary order.
One can acquire and increase wealth either through homesteading, producing and contractual exchange, or by expropriating and exploiting homesteaders, producers, or contractual exchangers. There are no other ways. Both methods are natural to mankind. Alongside an interest in producing and contracting there has always been an interest in nonproductive and noncontractual property and wealth acquisitions. And in the course of economic development, just as the former interest can lead to the formation of productive enterprises firms and corporations, so can the latter lead to largescale enterprises and bring about governments or states.[9]
The size and growth of a productive enterprise is constrained on the one hand by voluntary consumer demand, and on the other hand by the competition of other producers that continuously forces each firm to operate with the lowest possible costs if it wishes to stay in business. For such an enterprise to grow in size, the most urgent consumer wants must be served in the most efficient ways. Nothing but voluntary consumer purchases support its size.
The constraints on the other type of institution—the state—are altogether different.[10] For one thing, it is obviously absurd to say that its emergence and growth is determined by demand in the same sense as an economic firm. One cannot say by any stretch of the imagination that the homesteaders, the producers and the contractual exchangers who must surrender (part of) their assets to a state have demanded such a service. Instead, they are coerced into accepting it, and this is conclusive proof of the fact that the service is not at all in demand. On the other hand, the state is also not constrained in the same way by competition as is a productive firm. For unlike such a firm, the state must not keep its costs of operation at a minimum, but can operate at above-minimum costs, because it is able to shift its higher costs onto its competitors by taxing or regulating their behavior. Insofar as a state emerges, then, it does so in spite of the fact that it is neither in demand nor efficient.
Instead of by cost and demand conditions, the growth of an exploiting firm is constrained by public opinion: Nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions require coercion, and coercion creates victims. It is conceivable that resistance can be lastingly broken by force in the case of one man (or one group of men) exploiting one or maybe two or three others (or a group of roughly the same size). It is inconceivable, however, to imagine that force alone can account for the breaking down of resistance in the actually familiar case of small minorities expropriating and exploiting populations ten, hundreds, or thousands of times their size. For this to happen a firm must have public support in addition to coercive force. A majority of the population must accept its operations as legitimate. This acceptance can range from active enthusiasm to passive resignation. However, acceptance it must be in the sense that a majority must have given up the idea of actively or passively resisting any attempt to enforce nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions. Instead of displaying outrage over such actions, of showing contempt for everyone who engages in them, and of doing nothing to help make them successful (not to mention actively trying to obstruct them), a majority must actively or passively support them. State-supportive public opinion must counterbalance the resistance of victimized property owners such that active resistance appears futile. And the goal of the state, then, and of every state employee who wants to contribute toward securing and improving his own position within the state, is and must be that of maximizing exploitatively acquired wealth and income by producing favorable public opinion and creating legitimacy.
There are two complementary measures available to the state trying to accomplish this. On the one hand, there is ideological propaganda. Much time and effort is spent persuading the public that things are not really as they appear: Exploitation is really freedom; taxes are really voluntary: noncontractual relations are really “conceptually” contractual ones;[11] no one is ruled by anyone but we all rule ourselves; without the state neither law nor security exists; and the poor would perish, etc.
On the other hand, there is redistribution. Instead of being a mere parasitic consumer of goods that others have produced, the state redistributes some of its coercively appropriated wealth to people outside the state apparatus and thereby attempts to corrupt them into assuming state-supportive roles.
But not just any redistribution will do. Just as ideologies must serve a—statist—purpose, so must redistribution. Redistribution requires cost-expenditures and thus needs a justification. It is not undertaken by the state simply in order to do something nice for some people, as, for instance, when someone gives someone else a present. Nor is it done simply to gain as high an income as possible from exchanges, as when an ordinary economic business engages in trade. It is undertaken in order to secure the further existence and expansion of exploitation and expropriation. Redistribution must serve this strategic purpose. Its costs must be justified in terms of increased state income and wealth. The political entrepreneurs in charge of the state apparatus can err in this task, as can ordinary businessmen, because their decisions about which redistributive measures best serve this purpose have to be made in anticipation of their actual results. And if entrepreneurial errors occur, the state’s income may actually fall instead of rising, possibly even jeopardizing its own existence. It is the very purpose of state politics and the function of political entrepreneurship to avoid such situations and to choose instead a policy that increases state income.
While neither the particular forms of redistributive policies nor their particular outcomes can be predicted, but rather change with changing circumstances, the nature of the state still requires that its redistributive policy must follow a certain order and display a certain structural regularity.[12]
As a firm engaged in the maximization of exploitatively appropriated wealth, the state’s first and foremost area in which it applies redistributive measures is the production of security, i.e., of police, defense, and a judicial system. The state ultimately rests on coercion and thus cannot do without armed forces. Any competing armed forces—which would naturally emerge on the market in order to satisfy a genuine demand for security and protection services—are a threat to its existence and must be eliminated. To do this is to arrogate the job to itself and become the monopolistic supplier and redistributor of protection services for a defined territory. Similarly, a competing judicial system would pose an immediate threat to a state’s claim to legitimacy. And again, for the sake of its own existence the judicial system must also be monopolized and legal services included in redistributive schemes.
The state’s nature as an institution engaged in organized aggression also explains the importance of the next field of redistributive activities: that of traffic and communication. There can be no regular exploitation without monopolistic control of rivers, coasts, seaways, streets, railroads, airports, mail, and telecommunication systems. Thus, these things, too, must become the object of redistribution.
Of similar importance is the field of education. Depending as it does on public opinion and its acceptance of the state’s actions as legitimate, it is essential for a state that unfavorable ideological competition be eliminated as far as possible and statist ideologies spread. The state attempts to accomplish this by providing educational services on a redistributive basis.
Furthered by a system of state education, the next crucial area for redistribution is that of redistributing state power itself, i.e., the right assumed by the state to expropriate, exploit and redistribute nonproductively appropriated assets. Instead of remaining an institution which restricts entry into itself and/or particular government positions, a state increasingly, and for obvious strategic reasons, adopts an organizational structure which in principle opens up every position to everyone and grants equal and universal rights of participation and competition in the determination of state policy. Everyone—not just a privileged nobility—receives a legal stake in the state in order to reduce the resistance to state power.[13]
With the monopolization of law and security production, traffic, communication and education, as well as the democratization of state rule itself, all features of the modern state have been identified but one: the state’s monopolization of money and banking. For all but this one it has been explained, albeit briefly, how they can and must be understood as performing strategic functions: why and how they are not normal productive contributions determined by demand and supply forces or simply good deeds, but redistributive activities which serve the purpose of stabilizing and, if possible, increasing a state’s exploitatively appropriated income and wealth.
The monopolization of money and banking is the ultimate pillar on which the modern state rests. In fact, it has probably become the most cherished instrument for increasing state income. For nowhere else can the state make the connection between redistribution-expenditure and exploitation-return more directly, quickly and securely than by monopolizing money and banking. And nowhere else are the state’s schemes less clearly understood than here.
Preferring, like everyone, a higher to a lower income, yet unlike others, being in the business of nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions, the state’s position regarding money and banking is obvious: Its objectives are served best by a pure fiat money monopolistically controlled by the state. For only then are all barriers to counterfeiting removed (short of an entire breakdown of the monetary system through hyperinflation) and the state can increase its own income and wealth at another’s expense practically without cost and without having to fear bankruptcy.[14]
However, there are obstacles in the way of attaining this enviable state of affairs. On one hand, there is the inexorable fact that money can emerge only as a commodity. (It is impossible to start out with fiat money).[15] On the other hand, there is the problem that while enrichment through counterfeiting is no doubt less conspicuous than doing so by means of taxation, it is nonetheless a measure that is bound to be noticed, certainly by the banks, particularly if it occurs on a regular basis. And so it is also impossible for the state to get away with institutionalized counterfeiting unless it can be combined with redistributive measures which are capable of bringing about another favorable change in public opinion. This problem and the state’s natural desire essentially determine the course of its actions.
As the result of free market processes, the state finds gold established as money and a system of free banking. Its goal is the destruction of this system and with it the removal of all obstacles to counterfeiting. Technically (ignoring for the moment all psychological difficulties involved in this), the sequence of steps that must be taken in order to accomplish this objective is then dictated: In a first step the minting of gold must be monopolized by the state. This serves the purpose of psychologically denationalizing gold by shifting the emphasis from gold as denominated in universal terms of weight to gold as denominated in terms of fiat labels. And it removes a first important obstacle toward counterfeiting because it gives the state the very institutional means of enriching itself through a systematic process of currency debasement.
Second, the use of money substitutes instead of actual gold must be systematically encouraged and such a tendency backed up by the enactment of legal tender laws. The counterfeiting process thereby becomes much less costly. Instead of having to remint gold, only paper tickets must be printed.
However, the problem already discussed earlier remains. As long as a system of free banking is in operation, the counterfeit notes cannot be prevented from returning to the new issuer with the request for redemption, and he then cannot—at least not without a contractive adjustment—fulfill his obligations. To overcome this obstacle, in the next step the state must monopolize the banking system or force the competing banks into a cartel under the tutelage of its own state-operated central bank. Once it is in command of a monopolized or cartelized banking system, the state can put the coordinated and joint counterfeiting process of the entire banking system into effect that avoids this risk.
In the next step gold must be nationalized, i.e., the state must require all banks to deposit their gold at the central bank and conduct their business exclusively with money substitutes instead of gold. This way gold disappears from the market as an actually used medium of exchange and instead everyday transactions become increasingly characterized by the use of central banknotes.
Finally, gold being already out of sight and in the state’s sole possession, the state must cut the last tie to gold by reneging on its contractual obligations and declaring its notes irredeemable. Built on the ruins of gold, which as a commodity money standard initially made it possible that paper notes could actually acquire any purchasing power, a pure fiat money standard has been erected and can now be kept in operation, at long last handing the state the unlimited counterfeiting power that it had been vying for.
The goal of a complete counterfeiting autonomy likewise dictates the strategy that must be pursued on the psychological front. Obviously, in approaching its ultimate goal the state creates victims and thus it is also in need of favorable public opinion. Its rise to absolute counterfeiting power must be accompanied by redistributive measures that generate the support necessary to overcome all upcoming forces of resistance. It must look for allies.
Regarding the state’s monopolization of law and order, traffic, communication and education, and the democratization of its organizational structure—while it is clear that they are all redistributive measures and as such imply favoring one person at the expense of another—it is difficult if not impossible to identify the gainers and the losers with definite social classes: there can be gainers (or losers) across different classes: within one social class there can be gainers and losers; and the pattern of redistribution can shift over time. In all of these cases the link between the state’s redistributive expenditures and their payoffs is only indirect: whether or not certain education expenditures, for instance, pay off in terms of increased state income will only become visible at a later date; and even then it will be difficult to attribute such an outcome to a definite cause. In the case of the monopolization of money and banking, on the other hand, who outside the apparatus of the state itself will be the benefactors of its redistributive policies and who the losers will be is clear at once; and sociologically the benefactors can easily be identified with a specific social class. In this case the connection between the state’s handing out redistributive favors and its own enrichment is direct and close-circuited; and the attribution of causes obvious: The state is compelled to make banks and the social class of bankers its accomplices by allowing them to participate in its counterfeiting operations and so enrich themselves along with the state’s own enrichment.
Bankers would be the first ones to become aware of the state’s attempts at counterfeiting. Without special incentives to the contrary they would have no reason to support such actions and every reason to uncover and stop them as quickly as possible. And the state would not run into just any opposition here: bankers, because of their exalted position in economic life and in particular because of their far-reaching interconnectedness as a professional group resulting from the nature of their business as facilitators of interspatial and intertemporal exchanges, would be the most formidable opposition one might encounter. The incentive necessary to turn such potential enemies into natural allies is the state’s offer to cut them in on its own fraudulent machinations. Familiar with the ideas of counterfeiting and its great potential for one’s own enrichment, but knowing, too, that there is no chance of engaging in it without running the immediate risk of bankruptcy under free, competitive banking and a gold standard, bankers are faced with an almost irresistible temptation. Going along with the state’s policy of monopolizing money and banking also means fulfilling one’s own dreams of getting rich fast. Not only the state comes into its own once a pure fiat money standard is established. Provided that they are accorded the privilege by the state to counterfeit in addition to its own counterfeited notes under a monetary regime of less than 100-percent-reserve banking, with the central bank functioning as a last resort counterfeiter banks can only too easily be persuaded to regard the establishment of such a monetary system as their ultimate goal and as a universal panacea.[16]
Economically, this coalition between the state—as the dominant partner—and the banking system—as its affiliate—leads to permanent inflation (constrained only by the imperative of not overdoing it and causing a breakdown of the entire monetary system), to credit expansion and steadily recurring boom-bust cycles, and to a smooth uninterrupted income and wealth redistribution in the state’s and the banks’ favor.

Still more important, however, are the sociological implications of this alliance: With its formation a ruling class whose interests are tied in closely with those of the state is established within civil society. Through its cooperation the state can now extend its coercive power to practically every area of society.
Before the establishment of the state-banking alliance, the sociological separation between state and society, i.e., between an exploitative ruling class and a class of exploited producers, is almost complete and clearly visible. Here is a civil society that produces all economic wealth; and there is the state and its representatives who draw parasitically on what others have produced. People are members either of civil society or the state and see their own interests connected with either the former or the latter. To be sure, there are then redistributive activities going on which favor parts of society at the expense of others and which help divert interests from the pursuit of economic integration to that of supporting exploitation. Yet social corruption is unsystematic at this stage. It is not corruption of social classes which are connected society-wide, but rather corruption of various disparate and dispersed individuals or groups. And these interests are only connected to those of the state rather tenuously through certain specific redistributive state activities, rather than through a direct cash-connection.
With the formation of a state-banking alliance all this becomes different. A cash-connection between parts of civil society and the state exists—and nothing ties people more closely together than joint financial interests. Moreover, this connection is established between the state and what can be identified not only as a closely interconnected social class, but as one of the most widely influential and powerful ones. In fact, it is not just the banks who join interests with the state and its policy of exploitation. The banks’ major clients, the business establishment and the leaders of industry become deeply integrated in the state’s counterfeiting schemes, too. For it is they who, apart from state and banks, are the earliest receivers of most of the regularly created counterfeit money. In receiving it before it gradually ripples through the economic system, and thereby changes relative prices as well as increases the overall price level, and in receiving credit at fraudulently lowered interest rates, they too enrich themselves at the expense of all savers and all later recipients or nonrecipients of this money.[17]
Moreover, this financial coalition between the industrial establishment, banks, and the state tends to be reinforced by each successive course of events. The credit expansion leads to increased investment and—since it is not covered by an increase in genuine savings—will inevitably result in a corrective contraction. In order to avoid losses or even bankruptcy the bank’s clients will approach the banking system with an increased demand for liquidity (i.e., money). Naturally, to avoid losses of their own the banks are eager to help their clients out—and the more so the more established they are as clients. Unable to do this on their own, they turn to the state and its central bank. And the state, then, being offered another chance at its own enrichment, accepts and provides the banking system, and by extension the business establishment, with the needed liquidity by means of a new round of counterfeiting. The alliance is renewed, and the state has reaffirmed its dominant role by having saved the established banking and the industrial elite from crumbling in the face of economic competition and allowing them instead to preserve the status quo or even further increase the wealth already concentrated in their hands. There is reason to be thankful and to reciprocate with invigorated public support for the state and its propaganda.
To be sure, this coalition between the state and the economic power elite by no means implies a complete identity of interests. The various established industrial enterprises may have different or even contrary interests; and the same is true for the banks. Similarly, the interests of banks and business clients may in many respects be different. Nor do the interests of the industrial elite or the banks coincide completely with those of the state. For after all, banks as well as industrial enterprises are also in the “normal” business of making money through production and productive exchanges—whatever other sources of income acquisition may be available to them. And in this function their interests may well clash with the state’s desire for taxes, for instance. Nonetheless, the establishment of a system of monopolized money and banking still creates one interest common to all of them: an interest in the preservation of the state apparatus and the institution of political (i.e., exploitative) means of income appropriation as such. Not only could the state and its central bank destroy any commercial bank and, indirectly, practically any industrial enterprise; this threat is more severe the more established a business is. The state could also help any and all of them get richer, and more so if they are already rich. Hence, the more there is to lose from opposition and to gain from compliance, the more intensive will be the attempts by the economic power elite to infiltrate the state apparatus and have the state leaders assume financial interests in the business world. Bankers and industrialists become politicians; and politicians take positions in banking and industry. A social system emerges and is increasingly characteristic of the modern world in which the state and a closely associated class of banking and business leaders exploit everyone else.[18][19]
III. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ORDER
Man’s economic interests, i.e., his interests in improving his income and wealth by means of producing and exchanging, lead to the emergence of a universally used commodity money—gold—and a system of free banking.
Man’s political interests (i.e., his interests in improving his income and wealth through exploitation at the expense of producers and contractors) lead to the formation of states, the destruction of the gold standard and the monopolization of money and banking.
Yet once a state is established as a monopolist of exploitation and counterfeiting new problems emerge. For even if its monopolistic position is secured within a given territory, competition between states operating in different territories still exists. It is this competition which imposes severe limits on any one government’s exploitative powers. On one hand, it opens up the possibility that people will vote against a government with their feet and leave its territory if they perceive other territories as offering less exploitative living conditions. Or if other states are perceived as less oppressive, the likelihood increases of a state’s subjects collaborating with such foreign competitors in their desire to “take over.” Both of these possibilities pose a crucial problem for each state. For each literally lives off a population, and any population loss is thus a loss of potential state income. Similarly, any state’s interest in another’s internal affairs must be interpreted as a threat, in particular if it is supported by the latter’s own subjects, because in the business of exploitation one can only prosper as long as there is something that can be exploited and, obviously, any support given to another state would reduce what remains left over for itself.
On the other hand, with several competing states each individual state’s counterfeiting power becomes severely limited. In fact, on the international level a problem reemerges which is directly analogous to the obstacle to counterfeiting which was implied by a system of free banking, and which the states solved internally through the monopolization or cartelization of banking. The situation is characterized by different national paper monies with freely fluctuating exchange rates. If one state counterfeits more extensively than another, its currency is bound to depreciate in terms of the other, and for such a state this means (whatever different things it may mean for its various subjects) that its income has declined in relation to that of another state. With this its power vis-Ã -vis that of another state is decreased. It becomes more vulnerable to a competing state’s attacks (military or economic). Naturally, it is in no state’s interest to see this happen, and hence one’s counterfeiting desire must be restrained accordingly. Counterfeiting still continues permanently, of course, because it is in every state’s own interest; but no state is truly autonomous in its decision about how much to inflate and instead must at all times pay close attention to the inflationary policies of its competitors and flexibly adjust its own actions to theirs.
In order to maximize its exploitatively acquired income, it is in a state’s natural interest to overcome both of these external restrictions on internal power. Cartelization would seem a possible solution. However, it must fail as such because—due to the lack of a monopolistic enforcement agency—interstate cartels could only be voluntary and would hence appear less attractive to a state the more powerful it already is and the less inflationary its counterfeiting policy. By joining any such cartel a state would harm itself to the advantage of less successful and more inflationary states. There is only one stable solution for the problem then: A state must aim to expand its territory, eliminate its competitors and, as its ultimate goal, establish itself as a world government. And parallel to this must be its attempts to make its paper currency used in wider territories and ultimately make it the world currency under the control of its own world central bank. Only if these goals are achieved will a state come into its own. There are many obstacles on this path, and these may prove so severe as to make it necessary to settle for less than such a perfect solution. However, as long as there is a state in existence, such an interest is operative and must be understood as such if one is to correctly interpret past developments as well as future tendencies (after all it also took the states several centuries to reach their present internal counterfeiting powers!).
The means for accomplishing the first of its two integrated goals is war. War and state are inextricably connected.[20] Not only is a state an exploitative firm and its leading representatives can thus have no principled objection to nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions—otherwise they would not do what they do or the state would simply fall apart and dissolve. And it cannot be surprising then that they should also have no fundamental objection to a territorial expansion of exploitation by means of war. In fact, war is the logical prerequisite of a later cease-fire: and its own internal, institutionalized system of exploitation is nothing but a—legitimate—cease-fire, i.e., the result of previous conquests. In addition, as the representatives of the state they are also in command of the very means which make it increasingly likely that one’s aggressive desires can actually be put into effect. In command of the instrument of taxation and, even better for this purpose, of absolute internal counterfeiting powers the state can let others pay for its wars. And naturally, if one does not have to pay for one’s risky ventures oneself but can force others to do so, or if one can simply create the needed funds out of thin air, one tends to be a greater risk-taker and more trigger-happy than one would otherwise be.
While independent of demand and hence by nature a more aggressive institution than any normal business that would have to finance its wars with income gained exclusively through voluntary transactions and that would thus face immediate financial repercussions if only a single one of its clients reduced his purchases in response to his dissatisfaction with this business’ war policy, the state is still not entirely free of all constraints in its pursuit of foreign aggression. Just as states emerge although there is no demand for them, so wars occur without having been demanded. But as the emergence and the growth of states is constrained by public opinion, so also are the state’s war endeavors. For obviously, in order to come out of an interstate war successfully, a state must be in command of sufficient—in relative terms—economic resources which alone make its actions sustainable. However these resources can only be provided by a productive population. Thus, to secure the means necessary to win wars and to avoid being confronted with slackening productive outputs while at war, public opinion again turns out to be the decisive variable constraining a state’s foreign policy. Only if popular support for the state’s war exists can it be sustained and possibly won. The support from the banking and business establishment can be won easily, provided the foreign aggression promises a successful end and its cost can be established with a sufficient degree of accuracy. Not everyone of this class will be ready to join in, of course, because one may have vested interests in the to-be-conquered territory that will be damaged in the event of an interstate conflict; or one may wish that country C rather than B would be attacked; or one may even in principle be opposed to war. Generally, the expectation that along with one’s own state’s victory the business and banking elite would become established as a ruling class over a larger territory, with correspondingly expanded possibilities for financial exploitation, is a most powerful reason for the economic—in particular the banking—elite to pay close attention to the war option.
Yet their support is by no means sufficient. In a war even more so than during peacetime a state is dependent on every single person’s willingness to work and produce (there can no longer be any loafers during wartime). To ensure widespread enthusiasm, all states must help create and support nationalistic ideologies. They have to wrap themselves up as nation states and pose as the banner carriers and protectors of the superior values of one’s own nation as distinct from those of others, in order to generate the public identification with one specific state which is necessary in order to then turn around and wipe out the independence of more and more distinct nations and separate ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups.
However, something more substantial is required in order to keep the population working and producing the resources needed for a war: After all, the other states assumedly have the support of their business elite; and they, too, have created a spirit of nationalism in their territories. Assuming further that the antagonistic states initially control populations of comparable size and territories with similar natural endowments, the decisive variable determining victory or defeat becomes the relative economic wealth of the societies involved, their relative degree of economic development and capital accumulation. Those states tend to be victorious in interstate warfare that can parasitically draw on superior economic wealth. Clearly though, in order to be in this position conditions relatively favorable to wealth and capital formation in their respective territories must previously have existed. States do not positively contribute to this. On the contrary, as institutions engaged in nonproductive and noncontractual property acquisitions, their very existence is destructive of wealth and capital accumulation. However, they can make a negative contribution. Wealth and capital comes into existence only through homesteading, producing and contracting, and a relatively lower degree of exploitation of homesteaders, producers and contractors means a relative boost to capital formation, which in the next round of exploitation can give the state the additional resources needed to succeed militarily over its foreign competitors. Thus, what is also required in order to win wars is a relatively high degree of internal liberalism.
Paradoxical as it may first seem, the more liberal[21] a state is internally, the more likely it will engage in outward aggression. Internal liberalism makes a society richer; a richer society to extract from makes the state richer, and a richer state makes for more and more successful expansionist wars. And this tendency of richer states toward foreign intervention is still further strengthened, if they succeed in creating a “liberationist” nationalism among the public, i.e., the ideology that above all it is in the name and for the sake of the general public’s own internal liberties and its own relatively higher standards of living that war must be waged or foreign expeditions undertaken.
In fact, something still more specific can be stated about internal liberalism as a requirement and means for successful imperialism. The need for a productive economy that a warring state must have also explains why it is that ceteris paribus those states tend to outstrip their competitors in the arena of international politics which have adjusted their internal redistributive policies so as to decrease the importance of economic regulations relative to that of taxation. Regulations through which states either compel or prohibit certain exchanges between two or more private persons as well as taxation imply a nonproductive and/or noncontractual income expropriation and thus both damage homesteaders, producers or contractors. However, while by no means less destructive of productive output than taxation, regulations have the peculiar characteristic of requiring the state’s control over economic resources in order to become enforceable without simultaneously increasing the resources at its disposal. In practice, this is to say that they require the state’s command over taxes, yet they produce no monetary income for the state (instead, they satisfy pure power lust, as when A, for no material gain of his own, prohibits B and C from engaging in mutually beneficial trade). On the other hand, taxation and a redistribution of tax revenue according to the principle “from Peter to Paul,” increases the economic means at the government’s disposal at least by its own “handling charge” for the act of redistribution. Since a policy of taxation, and taxation without regulation, yields a higher monetary return to the state (and with this more resources expendable on the war effort!) than a policy of regulation, and regulation with taxation, states must move in the direction of a comparatively deregulated economy and a comparatively pure tax-state in order to avoid international defeat.[22]
With the backdrop of these theoretical considerations about the nature of the state and international politics, much of history falls into place. Lasting over centuries, practically uninterrupted series of interstate wars vividly confirm what has been stated about the inherently aggressive nature of states. Similarly, history dramatically illustrates the tendency towards increased relative concentration of states as the outcome of such wars: States’ aggressive expansionism has led to the closing of all frontiers, and a steady decline in the number of states along with an equally steady increase in the territorial size of those states that managed to survive. No world state has yet been brought about, but a tendency in this direction is undeniably present. More specifically, history illuminates the central importance that internal liberalism has for imperial growth: First, the rise of the states of Western Europe to world prominence can be so explained. It is in Western Europe that, built on the older intellectual traditions of Greek and Stoic philosophy as well as Roman law, the ideology of natural rights and liberalism emerged.[23] It was here that—associated with names such as St. Thomas Aquinas, Luis de Molina, Francisco Suarez and the late sixteenth century Spanish Scholastics, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and John Locke—it increasingly gained influence in public opinion; and where the various states’ internal powers of exploitation were then correspondingly weakened. And their power was even further weakened by the fact that pre-modern Europe was characterized by a highly competitive, almost anarchic international system, with a multitude of rivaling small scale states and feudal principalities. It was in this situation that capitalism originated.[24] Because the states were weak, homesteaders, producers and contractors increasingly began to accumulate capital; previously unheard of economic growth rates were registered; for the first time a steadily increasing population could be sustained; and, in particular with the population growth leveling off, gradually but continuously the general standard of living began to rise, finally leading to what is called the Industrial Revolution. Drawing on this superior wealth of capitalist societies the weak, liberal states of Western Europe became the richest states on earth. And this superior wealth in their hands then led to an outburst of imperialist ventures which for the first time in history established the European states as genuine world powers, extending their hegemonic rule across all continents.
Similarly, England’s outstanding role among the West European states can be explained. The most liberal country of all, the British government became the most successful imperialist.[25] And the relative decline of England (and Western Europe) and the rise of the U.S. to the world’s foremost imperialist power fits the theoretical picture as well. With no feudal past to speak of and British imperialism defeated, liberalism was still more pronounced in the U.S. than anywhere in Europe. State power was at its weakest, hardly to be noticed in people’s daily activities. Accordingly, economic growth was higher than in all other countries; standards of living went up; the population increased; and living standards and population size gradually surpassed those of all West European countries. At the same time, beginning in the late nineteenth century England and Western Europe suffered from reinvigorated internal statism brought about by the emergence of socialist ideologies on the European scene. It was this superior economic wealth—produced by a little exploited civil society—which allowed the internally weak U.S. government apparatus to slowly become the richest, most resourceful state, and turn these resources toward foreign aggression and in time establish itself as the dominant world power, with “home bases” all around the globe and direct or indirect military dominance and hegemonic control over a large part of the world (with the exception of the Soviet Union and China and their respective satellites).[26] The nineteenth century already displayed aggressive expansionism of the—liberal—U.S. government second to none. Since as early as 1801, when the U.S. Navy was sent on a punitive mission to the remote area around Tripolis, virtually no single year has passed without U.S. government intervention somewhere in the world.[27] Three major wars were waged: Against England (1812); against Mexico (1846–48), in which Mexico lost half its territory; and against Spain (1898), which resulted in the United States’ occupation of Cuba and the Philippines. Contrary to popular myth, the Civil War, too, was essentially an expansionist war waged by the relatively more liberal North against the Confederate states. However, the great breakthrough to world dominance did not occur until the twentieth century, when the U.S. entered World Wars I and II. Both wars dramatically proved the superiority of U.S. might over the European states. The U.S. determined the victors as well as the losers, and both wars ended with a victory of the more liberal U.S. government—resting on a less taxed and regulated economy—over all of the more socialist-authoritarian European states (including the Soviet Union) with their more heavily taxed and regulated economies. With the end of World War II the U.S. had reached hegemony over Europe and, as heir to the European states’ foreign empires, over large territories all around the world. Since World War II the U.S. has continued and even intensified its unrivaled expansionism with smaller or larger military interventions in Greece, Iran, Korea, Guatemala, Indonesia, Lebanon, Laos, Cuba, the Congo, British Guiana, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Chile, Grenada, and Nicaragua.[28]
Finally, history also provides the most vivid illustration of the direct link between a state’s internal powers of counterfeiting and its policy of external aggression, as well as the banking and business elite’s conspiracy with the state in its expansionist desires. The watershed mark in the process leading to the rise of the U.S. as the world’s premier power is World War I. The U.S. government could not have entered and successfully won this initially inner-European war without the absolute counterfeiting power that was achieved in 1913 with the establishment of the Federal Reserve System. It would have lacked the resources to do so. With a central banking system in place, a smooth transition to a war economy could be made and it became possible for the U.S. to get involved more deeply in the war and enlarge it to one of history’s most devastating wars. And just as the prior establishment of the Federal Reserve System had been enthusiastically supported by the banking establishment (in particular by the houses of Rockefeller, Morgan, and Kuhn, Loeb and Co.), so the U.S. policy of entering the war on the Allied side found its most ardent supporters among the economic elite (notably in the firm of J.P. Morgan and Co. as the fiscal agent of the Bank of England and monopoly underwriter of British and French bonds as well as a major arms producer, and represented within the Wilson administration by such powerful forces as W.G. McAdoo, secretary of the Treasury and Wilson’s son-in-law; Colonel P.M. House, Wilson’s intimate foreign policy adviser; and B. Strong, governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York).[29]
There is only one important element still missing from a complete reconstruction of the present international order: money. It is in a state’s natural interest to expand its territory militarily; and hence, one should expect a tendency toward a relative concentration of states. It is also in a state’s interest to engage in “monetary imperialism” (i.e., to extend its counterfeiting power over larger territories); thus, a tendency toward a one-world paper currency should be expected. Both interests and tendencies complement each other. On the one hand, any step in the direction of an international counterfeiting cartel is bound to fail if it is not complemented by the establishment of military dominance and hierarchy. External and internal economic pressures would tend to burst the cartel. With military superiority, however, an inflation cartel becomes possible. On the other hand, once military dominance has made such a cartel possible, the dominant state can actually expand its exploitative power over other territories without further war and conquest. In fact, the international cartelization of counterfeiting allows the dominant state to pursue through more sophisticated (i.e., less visible) means what war and conquest alone might not be able to achieve.
In the first step a dominant state (a state, that is, which could crush another militarily and is perceived as capable of doing so, in particular by the dominated government) will use its superior power to enforce a policy of internationally coordinated inflation. Its own central bank sets the pace in the counterfeiting process, and the central banks of dominated states are ordered to inflate along with the dominating state. In practical terms, the dominating state’s paper currency is imposed as a reserve currency on foreign central banks, and they are pressured to use it as a basis for their own inflationary actions.
Constrained not by actual demand but only by public opinion, it is relatively easy for a dominant state to accomplish this goal. Direct territorial conquest and the direct implementation of its own currency in foreign territories can be prohibitive because of the state of national or foreign public opinion. Yet with the power to destroy any specific foreign government—even thought it is not strong enough for a complete take-over—little is required in order for the dominant state to succeed in monetary imperialism.
Internally, it will most likely encounter no resistance whatsoever. The government itself will be satisfied with this solution. For once its own currency is employed as a reserve currency by foreign banks on which they then pyramid their various national paper monies, then it becomes possible for it to engage in an almost costless expropriation of foreign property owners and income producers without having to fear contractive consequences. Similarly, its own banking and business elite is ready to accept such an arrangement, because they, too, can thereby safely participate in foreign exploitation. Banks in particular are enthusiastic. And the public is largely ignorant of what is happening, or considers the exploitation of foreigners minor as compared to internal problems.
Externally, matters are only slightly more complicated. The dominated state loses resources to the dominating one as a consequence of monetary regime. But faced with the possibility of losing its internal control altogether, it naturally prefers acquiescing to a scheme which not only allows it to stay in power but to actually continue in its own fraudulent expropriations of its own population by inflating its currency on top of and in accordance with the dominating state’s paper money creation. For essentially the same reason bank and business elites, as the first receivers of their respective state’s counterfeit money, are willing to accept this solution. And the general public in the dominated territories, which through arrangement is subject to a double layer of exploitation of foreign states’ elites on top of a national state and elite, is again largely unaware of all this and fails to identify it as one important cause of its own prolonged economic dependency and relative stagnation vis-Ã -vis the dominant nation.
This first step, however, does not provide a perfect solution. The international monetary system is characterized by a dominant paper currency, and a multitude of national paper monies pyramiding on top of it, and freely fluctuating exchange rates between such currencies. On one hand, this is less than satisfactory for the dominant state, because under these circumstances ample room is left for the possibility of its own currency depreciating against others, and such a development would pose a threat to its own role as a dominant power. For exchange rates are not exclusively determined by the inflationary policies of various central banks. Ultimately and ceteris paribus, they are determined by purchasing power parity.[30] And even if a dominated central bank willingly inflates along with the dominating central bank, other factors (such as a lower level of taxation and regulation, for instance) can still make its currency appreciate against that of the dominant state.
On the other hand, the existence of a multitude of currencies freely fluctuating against each other is, as explained earlier, dysfunctional of the very purpose of money. It is a system of partial barter. It creates informational chaos, makes rational economic calculation impossible, accordingly leads to inefficiencies within the very system of production which the dominant state parasitically rests.
Thus, in order to assure its dominant position and maximize exploitatively appropriated income, in a second step a dominant state will invariably try to institute an international—and ultimately universal—currency monopolistically controlled and issued either directly by its own central bank or indirectly by an international or world bank dominated by its central bank.
There are some obstacles on the way to this goal. However, once the first step has been completed successfully, none of them would seem insurmountable. Naturally, the dominated state would lose some discretionary power under this arrangement. But this would be compensated for by the fact that its own economy would function more efficiently, too, if calculational chaos in international trade were reduced. Further, the banking and business elite in both countries would be adamantly in favor of such a monetary regime and would use their close ties to their respective state and international connections to promote its adoption. For, after all, banks and industrial firms are also in the business of making money through production and exchanges. Freely fluctuating exchange rates are an artificial impediment in their pursuit of this economic interest. And they will be perceived as dysfunctional more intensively by larger businesses, because it is big business, in particular, for which foreign trade plays a more important role.
In fact, the most severe resistance to the adoption of an international currency is to be expected not from the states and the economic elites, but from the general public. Insofar as an international currency implies giving up an accustomed one, it runs against the very nationalism that all states eagerly bred for so long. This would be a problem especially if the public in the dominated countries were asked to adopt the dominant state’s currency directly—name and all—because the underlying imperialist nature of such a monetary system would then become dangerously apparent. Yet with some degree of diplomacy and patient propaganda, this problem seems solvable, too. A new currency with a new name must be created and defined in terms of existing national monies in order not to arouse nationalistic or anti-imperialist sentiments. This new currency must only be somewhat overvalued against the various national monies (which in turn are defined in terms of the new currency) in order to drive all national monies out of circulation (in accordance with Gresham’s law).[31] This must be accompanied by the states’ and the economic elites’ constant appeal to the general public’s sound economic intuition that—regardless of all nationalistic feelings—freely fluctuating national monies are an anachronistic institution which cripples rational economic calculation, and that it is in everyone’s best interest to have an internationally (and if possible universally) used money such as the international banking system under the leadership of the dominant state’s central bank is willing to provide. Barring any drastic change in public opinion in the direction of a strengthened private property and sound money orientation and a correspondingly increased antistate vigilance, nothing will prevent the dominant state from achieving this complete international counterfeiting autonomy. And with a world money and world bank in place, and controlled by the dominant state’s central bank, a decisive step is taken toward reaching its ultimate goal of establishing itself as a full-scale world government, with world-wide control not only over counterfeiting, but also over taxation and legal regulation.
In light of this explanation of monetary imperialism and its function as a “natural” (from a statist viewpoint, that is) complement of military expansionism, the remaining pieces from the history of international politics fall into place. Hand in hand with the rise of Great Britain to the rank of the foremost imperialist nation state went a sterling imperialism. Not entirely free at the time of all internal obstacles in the way of counterfeiting, British-dominated countries were compelled to keep their reserves in the form of sterling balances in London, where the Bank of England would redeem them in gold. This way, these countries would pyramid their national currencies on top of the pound, and Britain could inflate sterling notes on top of gold without having to fear an outflow of gold. With Britain’s decline and the concurrent rise of the U.S. government to the position of the world’s leading military power, sterling imperialism has gradually been replaced by a dollar imperialism. At the end of World War II, with U.S. domination extended over most of the globe, and essentially ratified in the Bretton Woods agreement, the dollar became the world reserve currency on top of which all other states have inflated their various national paper monies.[32] For a while, the U.S. officially still maintained the pretense of redeeming foreign central banks’ dollars in gold, and this somewhat limited its own inflationary potential. However, it did not prevent steady dollar counterfeiting on top of gold from occurring. The position of the U.S. as a militarily dominant international power (in the meantime formalized through a number of military pacts, most notably the NATO) allowed it to compel foreign governments to exercise their right to ask for redemption only sparingly if at all, so that its own dollar inflation could take place without setting off contractive consequences. And when its counterfeiting policy had incited foreign governments to become all too daring in their attempts to obtain gold at bargain prices, it was the U.S. government’s superior military might that finally allowed it to give up all pretense and declare its notes irredeemable. Since then the Federal Reserve System has acquired the position of an autonomous counterfeiter of last resort to the entire international banking system.[33]
The imperialist nature of this dollar standard takes effect in particular through such instruments as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the Bank for International Settlement (BIS).[34] Money and credit, created by the strike of a pen, is passed from these U.S.-dominated institutions first to foreign governments which inflate their national currencies on top of it and in turn pass this money on to their own cartelized banking system which, adding a further dose of counterfeiting, then hand it on to the various states’ favorite business establishments whence it ripples to the economic periphery. Parallel to this flow of money goes a reversed process of income and wealth redistribution from the periphery onto national business and banking elites and the various nation states as well as from the dominated territories to the U.S. government and the U.S. banking and business establishment as the ultimate center of world finance.

From a sociological point of view, the consequences are particularly interesting if these two integrated processes are superimposed on pre-modern, feudal societies. Such countries, primarily in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, are typically characterized by a class of feudal landlords, or feudal landlords-turned-financial-or-industrial-magnates controlling the state apparatus and mostly residing in the capital-city-and-seat-of-government; and by a class of largely landless, dependent peasants dispersed over the countryside and sustaining the state, the feudal elite, and the capital city through the payment of land rents.[35] Dollar imperialism here means upholding feudal rule, supporting and participating in the exploitation of an impoverished peasantry and the countryside by a parasitic feudal caste and the capital city, and contributing in the latter’s suppression of any liberationist land reform movement. In fact, the typical Third World cycle of ruthless government oppression, revolutionary movements, civil war, renewed suppression, and prolonged economic dependency and mass poverty is to a significant extent caused and maintained by the U.S.-dominated international monetary system.
Since 1971, in particular, increased efforts have been undertaken in the direction of the second step in the process of monetary expansionism. Not all of the roughly 160 freely fluctuating currencies actually pose a problem, because most of them are in no danger for internal reasons of appreciating against the dollar and thereby strengthening the respective states’ power vis-Ã -vis that of the U.S. government, or they play such a minor role in international trade that the calculational chaos which is introduced by their existence is largely insignificant. However, because of the relative strength of their currencies and their important role in international trade, the major West European states as well as Japan are a problem. Hence it is to these states and currencies in particular that U.S-led attempts to create a world currency that helps rationalize economic calculation and at the same time safeguard U.S. domination and further increase its own inflationary powers have been directed. The creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), defined initially in terms of sixteen and later five leading export nations, and issued by the IMF, was a move toward a one-world currency and a one-world bank under U.S. domination.[36] Another important push toward this goal was provided through the activities of the Trilateral Commission (TC), founded in 1973 as an offshoot of David Rockefeller’s Council on Foreign Relations. Composed of some 300 highly influential politicians, bankers, businessmen, as well as intellectuals and journalists from North America, Western Europe and Japan, the TC has made the establishment of a world paper currency and a world central bank its primary concern.[37] Fervently supported by the TC as an intermediate step toward this ultimate goal as well as by several other politicianbanker-industrialist associations with a substantial overlap of membership with the TC and devoted to the same ends, such as the Action Committee for Europe, the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe, the Banking Federation of the European Community, the ECU Banking Association, the Basel Committee and the Wilton Park Group, great advances have been made in aligning the European monetary front. In 1979, the newly created European Currency Unit (ECU), issued under the aegis of the European Economic Community, first appeared. Defined as a weighted average of ten European currencies, and assisted by organizations such as the European Monetary System, the European Investment Bank, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, and the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, the ECU has assumed a more and more important rule. Since as an average it is less volatile than the various national currencies, multinational banks and corporations in particular have found it increasingly attractive to use the ECU as a unit of account and a medium of settlement: economic calculation is less haphazard with only three currencies—the ECU, the yen, and the dollar—than with a dozen. In 1998, according to official intergovernmental agreements, the European Central Bank was established and the ECU became the all-European currency supplanting all national monies.[38]
With the European calculational chaos solved, then, and in particular with the European hard currency countries neutralized and weakened within a cartel that by its very nature favors more against less inflationary countries so as to protect and prolong U.S. hegemony over Europe, little indeed would remain to be done. With essentially only three central banks and currencies and U.S. dominance over Europe and Japan, the most likely candidates to be chosen as a U.S-dominated World Central Bank are the IMP or the BIS: and under its aegis then, initially defined as a basket of the dollar, the ECU, and the yen, the “phoenix” (or whatever else its name may be) will rise as a one-world paper currency—unless, that is, public opinion as the only constraint on government growth undergoes a substantial change and the public begins to understand the lesson explained in this book: that economic rationality as well as justice and morality demand a worldwide gold standard and free, 100-percent reserve banking as well as free markets worldwide; and that world government, a world central bank and a world paper currency—contrary to the deceptive impression of representing universal values—actually means the universalization and intensification of exploitation, counterfeiting-fraud and economic destruction.[39]
NOTES
1. On the free-market development of money, see Carl Menger, Principles of Economics (New York: New York University Press, 1976), pp. 257–85; “Geld,” in Carl Menger, Gesammelte Werke, vol. IV (Tübingen: Mohr, 1970).
2. On the gold standard, see Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., ed., The Gold Standard: An Austrian Perspective (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1985), Ron Paul and Lewis Lehrman, The Case for Gold (San Francisco: Cato Institute, 1983).
3. On banking and in particular the different function of loan and deposit banking, see Murray N. Rothbard, The Mystery of Banking (New York: Richardson and Snyder, 1983).
4. See Murray N. Rothbard, The Case for a 100 Percent Gold Dollar (Meriden, Conn.: Cobden Press, 1984), pp. 32–34.
5. A highly prominent example for this misconception is F.A. Hayek, Denationalization of Money (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1976); for a critique see Murray N. Rothbard, “Hayek’s Denationalized Money,” Libertarian Forum XV, nos. 5–6 (August 1981–January 1982).
6. On the counterfeiting process, see Rothbard, The Mystery of Banking, chap. IV; also Elgin Groseclose, Money: The Human Conflict (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934), pp. 178 and 273.
7. On the Austrian business cycle theory, see Ludwig von Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit (lrvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1971); idem, Human Action (Chicago: Regnery, 1966), chap. XX; F.A. Hayek, Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1975); Prices and Production (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1967); Richard von Strigl, Kapital und Produktion (Vienna: Julius Springer, 1934); Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State (Los Angeles: Nash, 1970), vol. 2, chap. 12.
8. What about cartels? Could not the competing banks form a cartel and agree on a joint venture in counterfeiting? Again, under free banking this is most unlikely, because a system of free banking is characterized by the complete absence of any economic incentive for cartelization. With no restrictions of entry in existence, any such bank cartel would have to be classified as voluntary and would suffer from the same problems as any voluntary cartel: Faced with the threat of noncartelists and/or new entrants, and recognizing that like all cartel agreements, a banking cartel would favor the less efficient cartel members at the expense of the more efficient ones, there is simply no economic basis for successful action, and any attempt to cartelize would quickly break down as economically inefficient. Moreover, insofar as the counterfeit money would be employed to expand credit, banks acting in concert would set off a full-scale boom-bust cycle. This, too, would deter cartelization. See on the theory of free banking Mises, Human Action, pp. 434–48; Rothbard, The Mystery of Banking, chap. VIII.
9. Contrary to the claim of the public choice school, states and private firms are not doing essentially the same sort of business, but instead are engaged in categorically different types of operations. Both types of institutions are the outcome of different, antagonistic interests. The “political” interest in exploitation and expropriation underlying the formation of states obviously requires and presupposes the existence of wealth, and hence an “economic” interest of at least one person in producing such wealth in the first place (while the reverse is not true). But at the same time, the more pronounced and successful political interests are, the more destructive of economic interests this will be. The public choice school is perfectly correct in pointing out that everyone—a government employee no less than an employee of an economic firm—normally prefers a higher to a lower income and that this interest explains why government should be expected to have no less of a tendency to grow than any other enterprise. However, this discovery—that politicians and bureaucrats are no more altruistic or concerned about the public good than are people in other walks of life—is hardly new even if it has sometimes been overlooked. Yet what is in fact new with public choice is the inference drawn from this correct insight then, that all institutions should hence be regarded as an outgrowth of identical motivational forces and be treated analytically on a par with each other—is false to the point of being ridiculous. Regardless of a person’s subjective beliefs, integrating one’s actions into the institutional framework of either the state or a “normal” economic enterprise and pursuing one’s wealth maximizing interests here or there will in fact produce categorically different outcomes. On a representative statement of the public choice school regarding the idea of the “state as a firm” and of “political exchange” as essentially the same as economic exchange, see James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), p. 19; for a critique of this view and the fundamental difference between economic and political means, see Franz Oppenheimer, The State (New York: Vanguard Press, 1914), pp. 24–27; Murray N. Rothbard, Power and Market (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1977), chap. 2.
10. On the following theory of the state, see Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty (New York: Macmillan, 1978); The Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1982); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987); A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (Boston: Kluwer, 1989); Anthony de Jasay, The State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).
11. On the semantic confusion spread through the term “conceptual agreement” in particular by James Buchanan, see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “The Fallacies of the Public Goods Theory and the Production of Security,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 9, no. 1 (1989); supra, chap. 1.
12. See Hoppe, Eigentum, Anarchie, und Staat, chap. 5.3; A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, chap. 8.
13. On democratization as a means of expanding state power, see Bertrand de Jouvenel, On Power (New York: Viking Press, 1949), pp. 9–10.
14. On the state’s inherent tendency toward achieving an unrestricted counterfeiting monopoly, see Murray N. Rothbard, The Mystery of Banking; idem, What Has Government Done to Our Money? (San Rafael, Calif.: Libertarian Publishers, 1985).
15. On the impossibility of money originating as a fiat paper money, see the regression theorem: Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit, pp. 97–123; Human Action, pp. 408–10; Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, vol. I, pp. 231–37.
16. On the enthusiastic participation of the banking elite in the creation of the Federal Reserve System, see Rothbard, Mystery of Banking, chaps. XV, XVI.
17. On the formation of the state-banking-business coalition, see Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism (Chicago: Free Press, 1967); Railroads and Regulations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965); James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); Richard Radosh and Murray N. Rothbard, eds., A New History of Leviathan (New York: Dutton, 1972).
18. In the Marxist tradition this stage of social development is termed “monopoly capitalism,” “finance capitalism,” or “state monopoly capitalism.” The descriptive part of Marxist analyses is generally valuable. In unearthing the close personal and financial links between state and business, they usually paint a much more realistic picture of the present economic order than do the mostly starry-eyed “bourgeois economists.” Analytically, however, they get almost everything wrong and turn the truth upside down.
The traditional, correct pre-Marxist view on exploitation was that of radical laissez-faire liberalism as espoused by, for instance, Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer. According to them, antagonistic interests do not exist between capitalists as owners of factors of production and laborers, but between, on the one hand, the producers in society, i.e., homesteaders, producers and contractors, including businessmen as well as workers, and on the other hand, those who acquire wealth nonproductively and/or noncontractually, i.e., the state and stateprivileged groups, such as feudal landlords. This distinction was first confused by Saint-Simon, who had at some time been influenced by Comte and Dunoyer, and who classified market businessmen along with feudal lords and other stateprivileged groups as exploiters. Marx took up this confusion from Saint-Simon and compounded it by making only capitalists exploiters and all workers exploited, justifying this view through a Ricardian labor theory of value and his theory of surplus value. Essentially, this view on exploitation has remained typical for Marxism to this day despite Böhm-Bawerk’s smashing refutation of Marx’s exploitation theory and his explanation of the difference between factor prices and output prices through time preference (interest). To this day, whenever Marxist theorists talk about the exploitative character of monopoly capitalism, they see the root cause of this in the continued existence of the private ownership of means of production. Even if they admit a certain degree of independence of the state apparatus from the class of monopoly capitalists (as in the version of “state monopoly capitalism”), for them it is not the state that makes capitalist exploitation possible; rather it is the fact that the state is an agency of capitalism, an organization that transforms the narrow-minded interests of individual capitalists into the interest of an ideal universal capitalist (the ideelle Gesamtkapitalist), which explains the existence of exploitation.
In fact, as explained, the truth is precisely the opposite: It is the state that by its very nature is an exploitative organization, and capitalists can engage in exploitation only insofar as they stop being capitalists and instead join forces with the state. Rather than speaking of state monopoly capitalism, then, it would be more appropriate to call the present system “state financed monopoly socialism,” or “bourgeois socialism.”
For representative Marxist studies, see Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981); V.I. Lenin, Imperialism Last Stage of Capitalism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947); Paul M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1942); Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966); Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory (London: Merlin, 1962); Late Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1975); Herbert Meissner, ed., Bürgerliche Ökonomie ohne Perspektive (East Berlin: Dietz, 1976); on the perversion of the classical liberal class analysis through Marxism, see Murray N. Rothbard, “Left and Right” in Egalitarianism As a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays (Washington, D.C.: Libertarian Review Press, 1974); on the refutation of the Marxist theory of exploitation, see Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Karl Marx and the Close of His System, ed. Paul M. Sweezy, (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1948).
19. To recognize the far-reaching integration of state interests and those of the economic power elite, which is brought about by the monopolization of money and banking, is not to say that there cannot be conflicts arising within this coalition. As mentioned earlier, the state is also characterized, for instance, by the necessity of democratizing its constitution. And the democratic process could well bring egalitarian or populist sentiments to the surface which were opposed to the state’s favorable treatment of banks and big business. However, it is precisely the financial nature of the state-business connection that makes such an occurrence unlikely. For not only would this pose an immediate threat to theeconomic power elite; it would also imply severe financial losses in state income, even if it did not threaten the stability of the state as such. Hence a powerful incentive exists for both sides to join forces in filtering any such sentiment out of the political process before it ever becomes widely heard and to ensure with all resources at their command that the range of political alternatives admitted to public discussion is so restricted as to systematically exclude any scrutinizing of their joint counterfeiting racket.
See on this also such—in spite of their characteristic leftist misconceptions—informative studies as C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: 1965); G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (New York: 1967); E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt 1960); Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Power and Poverty (New York: 1970); C. Offe, Strukturprobleme des Kapitalistischen Staates (Frankfurt/M. Suhrkamp, 1972).
20. On the intimate relationship between state and war, see the important study by Ekkehart Krippendorff, Staat and Krieg (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1985); also Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter Evans, et al. eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
21. The term “liberal” is here and the following used in its traditional European sense and not in the present day U.S. sense as a synonym for “socialist” or “social-democratic.”
22. A highly characteristic example of this connection between a policy of internal deregulation and increased external aggressiveness is provided by the Reagan administration.
23. On the following see also Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “The Economics and Sociology of Taxation,” in Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 1, no. 2 (1990); supra chap. 2.
24. On the importance of “political anarchy” for the origin of capitalism, see Jean Baechler, The Origins of Capitalism (New York: St. Martin’s, 1976), chap. 7.
25. On British imperialism, see Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism 1860–1912 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
26. See on this and the following E. Krippendorff, Staat and Krieg, pp. 97–116.
27. See the table in Ekkehart Krippendorff, Die amerikanische Strategie (Frankfurt/M. Suhrkamp, 1970), pp. 43ff.
28. On twentieth-century U.S. foreign policy, see Leonard P. Liggio, “American Foreign Policy and National Security Management” in Radosh and Rothbard, A New History of Leviathan; Rothbard, For a New Liberty, chap. 14.
29. See on this Rothbard, Mystery of Banking, pp 230–47; on the role of the Morgans in pushing the Wilson administration into war, in particular see Charles Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1938), chaps. II–IV.
30. On the purchasing power parity theory, see Mises, Human Action, pp. 452–58; Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, pp. 715–22.
31. On Gresham’s law see Mises, Theory of Money and Credit, pp. 75, 77; Human Action, pp. 78l–83; Rothbard, Power and Market, pp. 29–31.
32. On the dollar standard established with the Bretton Woods system, see Henry Hazlitt, From Bretton Woods to World Inflation (Chicago: Regnery, 1984).
33. Since 1971, at which time the gold standard was finally suspended, more money has been created than had previously been accumulated by all nations of the world since the beginning of time.
34. On the imperialist nature of these institutions, see also Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War, the World and United States Foreign Policy 1943–1945 (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 242–340.
35. See Paul A. Baran, Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), chaps. V–VI.
36. See Hazlitt, From Bretton Woods to World Inflation.
37. A sample of prominent U.S. members of the Trilateral Commission includes David M. Abshire, counselor to the President; Frank C. Carlucci, national security advisor; J.C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State; Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve System; Winston Lord, Ambassador to China; George Bush, President; Paul A. Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve System; Alexander Haig, former Secretary of State; Jean Kirkpatrick, former Ambassador to the U.N.; David A. Stockman, former head of OMB; Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense; W. Michael Blumenthal, former Secretary of the Treasury; Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor; Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense; James E. (Jimmy) Carter, former President; Richard N. Cooper, former Undersecretary of State for Economic and Monetary Affairs; Walter Mondale, former Vice President; Anthony M. Solomon, former Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs; Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State; Andrew Young, former Ambassador to the U.N.; Lane E. Kirkland, head of AFL-CIO: Flora Lewis, New York Times; Thomas Johnson, Los Angeles Times; George Will, ABC television and Newsweek.
38. See on this also Jeffrey Tucker, “The Contributions of Menger and Mises to the Foundations of Austrian Monetary Theory Together With One Modern Application,” (manuscript 1988), presented at the 13th annual conference of The Association for Private Enterprise Education, Cleveland, Ohio; and Ron Paul, “The Coming World Monetary Order,” A Special Report from the Ron Paul Investment Letter (1988). Prominent Europeans explicitly supporting the idea of a European Central Bank, the ECU, and finally a one-world currency include: G. Agnelli, Chairman of FIAT, TC; J. Deflassieux, Chairman of the BIS, TC; G. FitzGerald, former Prime Minister of Ireland, TC; L. Solana, President of Compania Telefonica Nacional de Espana, TC; G. Thorn, President of the European Community and former Prime Minister of Luxembourg, TC; N. Thygesen, Professor of Economics, Copenhagen University, TC; U. Agnelli, Vice President of FIAT; E. Balladour, Financial Minister of France; N. Brady, Dillon Read Investments; J. Callaghan, former Prime Minister of Britain; K. Carstens, former President of West Germany; P. Coffey, Professor of Economics University of Amsterdam; E. Davignon, former European Commissioner; J. Delors, former President of the European Community; W. Dusenberg, President of BIS; L. Fabius, former Prime Minister of France; J.R. Fourtou, President of Rhone-Poulence; R. d. La Jemere, former Governor of the Banque de France; V. Giscard d’Estaing, former President of France; Ch. Goodhart, Professor of Banking, London School of Economics; P. Guimbretiere, Director of the European Community’s ECU project; W. Guth, President of the Deutsche Bank; E. Heath, former British Prime Minister; M. Kohnstamm, former President of European University Institute, Florence; N. Lawson, British Chancellor of the Exchequer; L.M. Leveque, President of Credit Lyonnais; L. Lucchini, President of Confindustria Italy; F. Maude, British Minister for Corporate and Consumer Affairs; P. Mentre, Chairman of Credit National, France; H.L. Merkle, Chairman of Bosch Gmbh, West Germany; F. Mitterand, President of France; J. Monet, founder of the European Community; P.X. Ortoli, President of Total Oil and former Commissioner of the European Community; D. Rambure, Credit Lyonnais; H. Schmidt, former Chancellor of West Germany and Editor of die ZEIT; P. Sheehy, Chairman of BAT Industries; J. Solvay, Chairman of Solvay, Belgium; H.J. Vogel, Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party; J. Zijlstra, former President of the Nederlandse Bank.
39. Jeffrey Tucker of the Ludwig von Mises Institute had an important influence on my understanding of the dynamics of the international monetary system—through frequent discussions as well as through granting me access to his own related research. Needless to say, all shortcomings are entirely my own.
Heiress / Celebutante Paris Hilton

14 August 2008
Heiress / Celebutante Paris Hilton

Manitoba Provincial Legislative Assembly Opposition Leader / Progressive Conservative Party Leader Hugh McFadyen

by "The Black Rod"
As originally posted on: The Black Rod
May 23, 2007
It's a good thing that the P.C. Party colour is blue, for it captures their after-vote blues so well, but yesterday you would be forgiven for thinking their colour was red.
That way the red-faces on the shamed Tory caucus and the red eyes and noses on weepy party supporters didn't look entirely out of place on election night.
There's no other way to say it. It was a rout.
Hugh McFadyen proved an unmitigated disaster as the new leader of the Progressive Conservatives. He accomplished what most pundits thought was impossible - he left the party with even fewer seats than Stu Murray.
Well, so much for McFadyen's grand vision of turning the Tories into NDP-lite. Or was it Liberals over-easy? That tsunami of federal Liberal voters he promised to deliver was nowhere to be seen even as the Devil danced away with the soul of the venerable party.
McFadyen's self-professed acumen as a political paragon now shares a shelf on the trashheap of history next to General George Custer's bravado at the Little Big Horn.
But before any further examination of the dismal prospects for the P.C.'s under McFadyen, we have to mention that strange exchange between party leaders which went unnoticed, or at least passed without comment by the reporters from the MSM.
It was an unprecedented gutter fight in full view of the cameras, though veiled in such genteel pretense that it slipped past everyone, except the initiated.
In his concession speech, McFadyen suddenly began extolling the support he received from his family throughout the campaign. He praised his wife by name, and gave her a big smooch. And he repeated how important it had been to have her steadfastly by his side.
A touching moment, surely. And pointed, like the tip of a stiletto. His target didn't fail to feel the sting.
Re-elected premier Gary Doer responded in his victory speech, a speech so loaded with cheap and unnecessary shots at the Opposition as to sour any listener expecting a winner to take the high road. At the end, Doer, too, spoke of the importance of having the support of his family.
Except he failed to name what's-her-face, his wife, who stood at a respectful distance and smiled and nodded on cue. Just like Sam Katz's wife on his election night.
And the Mrs. - Ginny Devine, to the initiated - got no kiss.
For, say those in a position to know, a sad announcement is coming sooner rather than later, now that the election is over.
Doer did, however, express his desire - for a cold beer. Once. Twice. Well, we stopped counting at three.
Strange indeed that the loser mentioned the First Lady by name off the top, while her husband focused on his future with his preferred cold beverage.
Meanwhile, the braintrust at 23 Kennedy is facing an uncomfortable future explaining to the died-in-the-wool Tory core why they thought a campaign designed to ignore long-simmering public outrage about NDP scandals, broken promises and outright incompetence was a winning formula.
The caucus is left to wonder what issues they can possibly raise in Question Period (besides the Grace Hospital crisis) that will put heat on the NDP.
They are also left to wonder how they can even pretend to trust their leader's judgement on what matters to the public, when he made crime the main issue but failed to engage the very ridings most affected. Candidate selection was left to the last minute in several inner-city ridings and they didn't open offices until halfway through the election campaign.
Who is responsible for this lack of preparation?
At the top of the list is Hugh McFadyen, who convinced the party that he had the backroom smarts and moxie on the hustings that Stu Murray lacked. Instead he became an anchor around the necks of Tory candidates young and old. Just ask Bonnie Mitchelson.
The story of Hugh McFadyen's career as party leader begins and ends in Southdale, where the NDP started their election campaign by immediately putting him on the defensive, from which he and the career of longtime stalwart MLA Jack Reimer never recovered.
Brandon heavyweight Rick Borotsik barely squeeked into a seat in spite of Hurricane Hugh's visits to the Wheat City, each of which dragged the popular former Mayor deeper under the waves. Just ask Mike Waddell.
And if the shattered caucus needed any further proof of the drag of McFadyen's personal popularity, they need only look to the PC's New Generation star candidate in Kirkfield Park (Stu Murray's old riding), where Chris Kozier failed to win a single poll.
Hugh McFadyen was elected party leader a year ago to breath fire into a party demoralized by the leadership of meek, mild mannered Stu Murray, who couldn't rouse himself to utter a harsh word against turncoats like John Loewen, backed down to Crocus bullies, and was thought to have taken the party to the lowest depths possible with the Manitoba electorate.
Until Hurricane Hugh showed what he could do.
13 August 2008
English Canada

12 August 2008
Comcast Corporation

· Disclose the details of its discriminatory network management practices to the Commission
· Submit a compliance plan describing how it intends to stop these discriminatory management practices by the end of the year
· Disclose to customers and the Commission the network management practices that will replace current practices
on the Commission’s web site http://www.fcc.gov
The Russian Federation (a/k/a Russia)

Mikheil Saakashvili told a national security meeting on Monday that Russia's military had "cut off connections between western and eastern Georgia".
However, Russia denied taking Gori, which sits on Georgia's only east-west main road and from which Moscow could cut off eastern Georgia from the country's western Black Sea coast.
'Total onslaught'
"Georgian armed forces received an order to leave Gori and to fortify positions near Mtskheta to defend the capital."
Jonah Hull, Al Jazeera's correspondent, confirmed that the city of Gori had been largely evacuated.
"I have seen civilians and the army fleeing. Georgian troops clinging to the back of quad bikes. I have seen tanks leaving in no particular formation.
"Basically, it's panic."
The UNHCR, the United Nation's refugee agency, said that 80 per cent of the 50,000 population of Gori had fled because of Russian attacks.
At least seven Georgian soldiers were injured in an attack on a military convoy leaving Gori, according to an AFP news agency photographer.
"[Its] actions this week have raised serious questions about its intentions in Georgia and the region."
'Premeditated murder'
"Tbilisi was bombed. Bombs hit the village of Kojori and Makhata mountain," the ministry said in a statement.
Saakashvili said that "cold-blooded, premeditated murder" had been committed against his country and said that there would be "no surrender" to Russian aggression.
"The world has a moral duty to stop the madness," he said.
"It is obvious... the Russian invasion had been planned for months and months and months. The timing of this intervention has been chosen deliberately [with regards] to the Olympics," he said.
"It is so clear what has happened. We are in the process of invasion, occupation and annihilation of a democratic, independent country.
"Please wake up everybody and make your position and speak with a united voice ... We are seeing the cold-blooded, pre-meditated, murder of a small country."
11 August 2008
Canadian Superlobbyist / Former Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney

10 August 2008
American Television Journalist / Political Commentator Bill O'Reilly
Canadian Federal Member of Parliament / Former Federal Justice Minister / Former Manitoba Provincial Attorney General Vic Toews

Potential post for Toews raises ethical concerns
by Campbell Clark
As originally published in: The Globe and Mail
May 17, 2008
OTTAWA — The federal Conservatives could raise questions of possible conflict of interest and transparency if they move to appoint cabinet minister Vic Toews as a judge in Manitoba, opposition MPs say.
Published reports yesterday stated that Mr. Toews, the president of the Treasury Board, is being vetted for a federal appointment to Manitoba's Court of Queen's Bench.
Rumours that Mr. Toews might not seek re-election have circulated in Ottawa for some time, but his office insists he intends to run again.
However, his spokesman, Mike Storeshaw, would not say yesterday whether Mr. Toews has signed the application form required before he can be considered for a judicial appointment.
“All I know is that he is the nominated candidate and he said he intends to run as the nominated candidate for the next election,” he said.
Opposition MPs said that if he does seek a judgeship, Mr. Toews's role in recommending members of the judicial advisory committee that evaluates applicants for higher-court judgeships in Manitoba could raise a potential conflict.
The committees, set up in each province to recommend candidates to the justice minister for federal judicial appointments, are supposed to ensure applicants are vetted at arm's-length from politicians.
In 2006, Mr. Toews, then the justice minister, restructured the advisory committees so that four of the seven voting members, rather than three, were chosen by the minister, including one drawn from the ranks of the police, while the rest are chosen by lawyers associations and judges.
His successor as justice minister, Rob Nicholson, announced new committees two weeks after he entered the post, in January, 2007, but many of the members had been chosen by Mr. Toews.
One member of the Manitoba committee, Jude Gosselin, told The Globe and Mail last year he was approached about the post by an aide to Mr. Toews.
Winnipeg New Democrat MP Pat Martin said he believes Mr. Toews – a former Crown prosecutor and attorney-general of Manitoba – is qualified, but appointing him through the existing process would raise questions of conflict of interest.
“I think this has inherent conflict of interest built right into it, if Vic Toews had an active role in choosing the oversight committee that will review and vet his appointment,” he said.
Liberal MP Dominic LeBlanc noted the justice minister appoints judges, but the advisory committees are intended to ensure that the process is transparent.
“If the person being evaluated was involved in the appointment of the advisory committee, it can certainly leave the impression of something less than transparent,” he said.
Mr. LeBlanc said Mr. Nicholson should name others, such as respected judges and senior lawyers from the province, to vet Mr. Toews if he is to be appointed.
A spokeswoman for Mr. Nicholson, Geneviève Breton, did not answer a question about whether any special process had been set up for the review of any nominee.
Mr. Toews's political profile has lessened since he was shuffled out of the justice portfolio. And there is speculation that his messy divorce from his wife of 32 years, Lorraine Fehr, now before the courts in Manitoba, might cause disaffection among conservative Christian voters in his Provencher riding.
Ms. Fehr filed for divorce in March, stating the couple had been separated for more than a year. She sought spousal support and detailed $12,930 in monthly expenses.
With a report from Joe Friesen in Winnipeg
09 August 2008
Reverend / Civil Rights Activist Jesse Jackson

Fox: Jackson used N-word in crude off-air remarks
by Sophia Tareen
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
July 17, 2008
CHICAGO (AP) — The Rev. Jesse Jackson used the N-word during a break in a TV interview where he criticized presidential candidate Barack Obama, Fox News confirmed Wednesday.
The longtime civil rights leader already came under fire this month for crude off-air comments he made against Obama in what he thought was a private conversation during a taping of a "Fox & Friends" news show.
In additional comments from that same conversation, first reported by TVNewser, Jackson is reported to have said Obama was "talking down to black people," and referred to blacks with the N-word when he said Obama was telling them "how to behave."
Though a Fox spokesman confirmed the TVNewer's account to The Associated Press, the network declined to release the full transcript of the July 6 show and did not air the comments.
Jackson — who is traveling in Spain — apologized in a statement Wednesday for "hurtful words" but didn't offer specifics.
"I am deeply saddened and distressed by the pain and sorrow that I have caused as a result of my hurtful words. I apologize again to Senator Barack Obama, Michelle Obama, their children as well as to the American public," Jackson said in a written statement. "There really is no justification for my comments and I hope that the Obama family and the American public will forgive me. I also pray that we, as a nation, can move on to address the real issues that affect the American people."
A spokeswoman for Jackson's civil rights organization, Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, said she could not confirm that Jackson used the slur.
Jackson has called on the entertainment industry, including rappers, actors and studios, to stop using the N-Word. He also urged the public to boycott purchasing DVD copies of the TV sitcom "Seinfeld" after co-star Michael Richards was taped using the word during a rant at a Los Angeles comedy club in 2006.
The Rev. Al Sharpton, who has joined Jackson in opposition of the word, said Wednesday he wanted to hear the comments for himself and declined to discuss Jackson specifically.
"I am against the use of the N-word by anyone and I think we must be consistent," he told The Associated Press. "We must not use the word."
08 August 2008
Manitoba Provincial Crown Prosecutors

The following decision has been edited in terms of its content (in all cases, simply to shield the identity of the accused).
IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF MANITOBA
BETWEEN
Her Majesty the Queen
Ms Raegan Rankin
For the Crown
and
[S.W.]
Mr. Evan Roitenberg
and Mr. Grant Stefanson
For the Accused
Reasons for Decision delivered
on the 20th day of February, 2004,
at the City of Winnipeg in
the Province of Manitoba.
SUSAN DEVINE, P.J.
Issue:
[1] By motion heard December 1, 2003, [S.W.] seeks from this court a declaration that his rights under sections 7 and 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms have been violated. As a result of the abuse of process and unreasonable delay that he alleges to have occurred, he seeks the remedy of an order pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter judicially staying proceedings on the pending charges.
The Charges and a Brief Chronology:
[2] On May 30th, 2001, [S.W.] was released by a police officer on a promise to appear with an undertaking to make his first court appearance on July 25, 2001 in Winnipeg. This release was in relation to charges laid on July 23, 2001, pursuant to sections 130(a) and 342.1 of the Criminal Code. They alleged that between May 15th and 19th of 2001, [S.W.] falsely represented himself to be a named peace officer in certain telephone conversations with Winnipeg Police personnel and thereby fraudulently accessed the computer services of the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) computer system.
[3] A trial that had been scheduled for May 1st and 2nd 2003, was begun but ultimately ended in a mistrial. New trial dates were set for December 1st and 2nd 2003, some 30 months after proceedings were initially commenced.
[4] The trial did not begin on December 1st, as counsel had made no arrangements to have this delay motion heard in advance of the trial date. With the passage of the first day consumed by counsels’ arguments, it was evident that regardless of my decision, we would still not have had the two days needed to hear the evidence. Proceedings were therefore adjourned to April 13 and 14, 2004, the earliest consecutive days available to hear the evidence should this motion fail and the trial proceed.
The Evidence on the Motion:
[5] Defence filed affidavits of [S.W.] and of Mr. Stefanson, co-counsel. Transcripts of earlier court proceedings were appended to [S.W.]'s affidavit as exhibits. Defence also called one witness, Michel Foubert.
[6] Crown filed one affidavit, that of Brian Wilford who was the Crown who had carriage of the matter at the time of the original trial date.
[7] There was no cross-examination on any of the affidavits filed.
The Events of May 1st , 2003
[8] At the outset of the trial before my colleague, Lismer P.J., defence counsel Evan Roitenberg sought an adjournment of the trial in order to prepare for the voir dire that would now be required for comments made by his client at the time of his arrest. Crown counsel, Brian Wilford, had notified Mr. Roitenberg just one hour before the trial was to start that morning that he had changed his mind and would now be seeking to tender [S.W.]’s comments in evidence. Mr. Roitenberg said that he had not prepared to deal with a voir dire that might entail a Feeney issue (see R. v. Feeney 1997 CanLII 342 (S.C.C.), [1997] 2 S.C R. 13) being raised by defence. At the pre-trial conference the previous November, the Crown had expressly indicated that these comments would not be introduced into evidence.
[9] Rather than granting the adjournment, Judge Lismer accepted the suggestion of the Crown that 4 of his 5 civilian witnesses could testify that day. The voir dire could take place the following afternoon, thus giving Mr. Roitenberg the evening to prepare. Mr. Roitenberg was then given a brief adjournment to seek instructions from his client and to ascertain if this new information would impact on his cross-examination of the civilian witnesses.
[10] When court resumed the Crown called its first witness, Michel Foubert. Mr. Foubert recounted a discussion that he had had with [S.W.], his neighbour in his apartment block, about running the license plate numbers of certain cars to assist in identifying the person who had stolen Mr. Foubert’s bike. At that point in the testimony, the Crown showed Mr. Foubert three documents with handwriting on them that referenced certain license plate numbers. The witness identified the documents as items that had been given to him by [S.W.]. Defence counsel then objected, stating that he had never seen the documents that the witness was identifying.
[11] Crown counsel confirmed that the police had provided him with the envelope containing the documents only that morning, just before court, and that he had forgotten to advise defence about the documents or to show them to him. Crown then offered not to make use of the documents.
[12] After a brief recess to review the documents, the witness was excused. Defence asked for a mistrial and for the matter to be adjourned, on the basis that the information in the documents would be helpful to the defence and that he would like an opportunity to pursue it. He said that the license plate numbers in these documents were not in fact the same numbers that the Crown particulars had identified as the numbers run by [S.W.] for his neighbour.
[13] In the course of the dispute between counsel about the relevance of Mr. Foubert’s pieces of paper, Crown also made reference to certain "call histories" taken by two Crown witnesses from "CPIC" and "Tele-coms". Defence indicated that he had not been provided with those documents either. Crown indicated that it appeared that inadvertently the particular documents had not been sent out to defence with the rest of the disclosure.
[14] Judge Lismer put the matter over to the following day to allow counsel to consider this new evidence that had not been previously disclosed and to ascertain potential continuation dates in the event that he did not declare a mistrial but adjourned the matter instead. He then called the witness back into the courtroom, telling him that a matter had arisen that required further preparation and excusing him until the next day, saying:
…and in the meantime, I have to give you the usual caution, as you are a witness of the court, do not discuss this evidence with anyone or permit anyone to discuss it with you in the meantime.
The Events of May 2, 2003:
[15] The following day a new Crown counsel, Mr. Bellay, appeared for the Crown and told the Court that Mr. Wilford was too ill to attend court that morning. Mr. Bellay advised the Court that he was therefore seeking an adjournment to set a continuation date and that the witness, Mr. Foubert, had already been told that he need not attend.
[16] Judge Lismer said that he had just noticed in looking at the charge that it appeared that no plea had been entered. If so, the proceedings to that juncture would seem to have been a nullity. Crown suggested that since the matter would have to be adjourned in any event, the transcript of proceedings on the day the trial date was set should be consulted to determine the issue.
[17] Mr. Roitenberg asked the Court to reserve on the issue of the mistrial because he also wished to bring a motion for a judicial stay of proceeedings on the issue of Mr. Wilford speaking to the witness after court had adjourned the previous day, contrary to the order of the Court. He said that he had phoned Mr. Wilford at his home that morning to advise him of his intention to make the motion, and to ask the Court to examine Mr. Foubert on the point. Mr. Wilford had then told him that he had already excused Mr. Foubert from attending court.
[18] The matter was then adjourned to May 14th to investigate the issue of the plea and to consider continuation dates before Judge Lismer on the outstanding issues.
[19] On May 22nd, a continuation date was set for December 22nd and 23rd. At Mr. Roitenberg’s request, the trial date was then able to be moved ahead slightly to December 1st and 2nd. At an appearance before that new trial date of December 1st, Judge Lismer concluded that he had been without jurisdiction for the earlier proceedings and that he must therefore declare a mistrial, absent defence consent to the evidence already heard being applied to the trial. Such consent was not given.
The law on Section 7, Abuse of Process and Crown Conduct:
[20] Even before the advent of the Charter, at common law a trial judge was acknowledged to have the discretion to stay proceedings to prevent the abuse of the court’s process through frivolous or vexatious proceedings, for example. In R. v. Keyowski 1988 CanLII 74 (S.C.C.), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 657 the Supreme Court had to consider whether such a common law remedy would be available to a trial judge to prevent a retrial if no prosecutorial misconduct had been demonstrated. Wilson J. concluded for the court that a series of trials could per se constitute an abuse of process:
….Prosecutorial conduct and improper motivation are but two of many factors to be taken into account when a court is called upon to consider whether or not in a particular case the Crown’s exercise of its discretion to re-lay the indictment amounts to an abuse of process. (paragraph 3)
[21] In R. v. O’Connor 1995 CanLII 51 (S.C.C.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 the Supreme Court was dealing with the impact of non-disclosure by the Crown and the issue of third party records. In the course of her decision, Justice L’Heureux-Dube commented that the common law doctrine of abuse of process was for the most part subsumed by section 7 of the Charter. She also noted that generally a specific Charter right such as the section 7 protection of a fair trial, or the section 11(b) protection of a timely one, would be engaged but went on to say:
In addition, there is a residual category of conduct caught by section 7 of the Charter. This residual category does not relate to conduct affecting the fairness of the trial or impairing other procedural rights enumerated in the Charter, but instead addresses the panoply of diverse and sometimes unforeseeable circumstances in which a prosecution is conducted in such a manner as to connote unfairness or vexatiousness of such a degree that it contravenes fundamental notions of justice and thus undermines the integrity of the judicial process. (paragraph 73)
[22] The most recent Supreme Court of Canada decision involving a discussion of the remedy of a stay of proceedings for a breach of section 7 Charter rights is that of R. v. Taillefer; R. v. Duguay [2003] S.C.J. No. 75. In that decision released December 12, 2003, Lebel J. for the court considered the significance of a Crown failure to make certain disclosure in a first degree murder case. In determining the appropriate remedy, he affirmed some of the earlier jurisprudence of the court in cases such as R.v.O’Connor (above), R. v. Carosella 1997 CanLII 402 (S.C.C.), [1997] 1 S.C.R.80 and R.v. Regan 2002 SCC 12 (CanLII), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297. Due to what he termed the draconian nature of a stay of proceedings, he said that it is clear that it is to be used as a remedy only as a “last resort”, if there are no other means of affording an accused the right to make full answer and defence.
[23] On the specific issue of whether it should be used by a court as a remedy in those instances where it is the Crown conduct itself or its impact on proceedings that has caused the violation of these rights he stated:
….Although in very rare circumstances, the conduct of the prosecution may be so serious that a stay of proceedings is required in order to avoid bringing our system of justice into disrepute, it is not the purpose of this remedy to punish blameworthy conduct on the part of the state. The remedy is primarily meant to prevent an abuse from being perpetuated or aggravated. (paragraph 119)
[24] Presumably the earlier case cited to me on this point by defence would amount to one such occasion. This is the decision in R. v. Greganti [2000] O.J. No. 34 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) where a stay of proceedings was granted based on Crown conduct in a prosecution of very serious drug charges. Between August 26 and September 9, 1999, the latter being one day after the three week trial was to have commenced, some 3500 additional pages of disclosure were provided to defence. This was 12 months after the preliminary had concluded and 28 months after the charges had been laid. These particulars included 1500 pages of source debriefing notes, 2000 pages of continuation notes in relation to wiretap applications, 154 pages of police notes, a 24-page surveillance report and 15 negative certificates of analysis. Justice Stayshyn considered the factors set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in its many pronouncements on the issue and concluded that the egregious bad faith behaviour of the Crown and police in this prosecution was deliberate. Accordingly the continuation of the prosecution of even such serious drug charges would shock the community sense of fairness and decency. He stayed the charges.
The conduct of Crown counsel in this case:
[25] Defence complains of the actions of Crown counsel in speaking to his witness outside the courtroom immediately after this witness, in the presence of the accused, had been told by the trial judge not to discuss his evidence with anyone.
[26] Chapter 9 of The Law Society of Manitoba’s Code of Professional Conduct is styled “The Lawyer as Advocate”. Section 16, in wording similar to such provisions in other Canadian jurisdictions, sets out the general professional standard expected of counsel in dealing with witnesses:
When in court the lawyer should observe local rules and practices concerning communication with a witness about the witness’s evidence or any issue in the proceeding. Generally it is considered improper for counsel who called a witness to communicate with that witness without leave of the court while such witness is under cross-examination.
[27] A footnote to section 16 cites the “Commentary” to the same rule in the Ontario Code that gives more specific guidance for counsel about appropriate guidelines in communicating with witnesses who are in the course of giving their evidence. The subsection dealing with situations such as that in the case at bar says:
(a) During examination-in-chief: it is not improper for the examining lawyer to discuss with the witness any matter that has not been covered in the examination up to that point.
[28] Interestingly, this is unlike the situation in England and Wales where barristers are prohibited from any such communication with a witness who has commenced testimony until the conclusion of their evidence, unless the opposing counsel or the Court have expressly consented. (see Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, 7th edition, section 705)
[29] In the ordinary course then, it would seem that there would be nothing improper about Mr. Wilford speaking with his witness about the prospective evidence of the witness. Here however the situation was much less clear-cut.
[30] The witness had already been asked on the stand about the information that he claimed had been provided to him by the accused. Mr. Wilford had then put to him the three documents for identification just before the defence objection was made. Arguably then this was an area in which the Crown had to tread carefully since the witness was in the course of giving his testimony in relation to such information. More importantly however, the judge in adjourning the matter had apparently given a blanket admonition to the witness not to discuss his or her evidence with anyone.
[31] Therefore it would have been vastly preferable for Mr. Wilford to have asked the judge for clarification on whether the judge had in fact intended to prevent him speaking further to his witness or to impose any limitations on his doing so.
[32] This would have made the situation much more straightforward and comprehensible not just for counsel, but even more importantly for both the witness and the accused. Defence correctly points out that either or both of them might have thought that the Crown’s actions in approaching the witness outside of the courtroom were inconsistent with the order that they had just heard the judge make. Such a perception on their part would not be in the service of the administration of justice overall.
[33] However, in the circumstances before me, I cannot conclude that Mr. Wilford intended by his actions to disobey the order of the Court. According to his affidavit, it was his view, based on the past law and practise in this jurisdiction, that he was free to continue to speak to his witness despite the judge’s comment. As noted above, he should not necessarily have made this assumption on this occasion, having regard to the explicit wording of the judge’s order. Even more significantly, he should not have cavalierly dismissed the concerns of defence counsel once this matter was brought to his attention. Even if he thought defence counsel was wrong, the more prudent course of action would have been to then seek clarification from the judge, something that it might have been possible to do immediately since court had just adjourned.
[34] Although Mr. Wilford’s conduct may inadvertently have been conduct that could have tended to “bring the administration of justice into disrepute” in the eyes of the witness, and/or the accused, I cannot conclude, in light of the case law cited above, that this conduct rises to a level that warrants a stay of proceedings as a necessary or appropriate remedy. An explanation to the accused and to the witness once court resumed about counsels’ disagreement as to the meaning of the judge’s order would likely have been sufficient to rectify the situation in this case. Crown counsel’s conduct did not in actuality compromise [S.W.]’s ability to have a fair trial nor should it have created such a perception in a reasonably informed member of the public.
[35] The wording of my colleague’s order did not differ appreciably from similar orders that I have routinely made, in similar circumstances of adjourning the ongoing testimony of a witness. It is impossible to know whether or not on this occasion Judge Lismer had explicitly turned his mind to the issue of what, if any, contact either Crown or defence were intended to have to the witness overnight and whether or not he intended his order to impose any limits on such contact. However, as I have noted above, in the event that any such order raises any question in the mind of either or both counsel, prudence dictates that they should seek clarification from the judge before potentially acting in breach of such an order.
The Law on Section 11 and Unreasonable Delay:
[36] The leading case on the issue of unreasonable delay continues to be the decision of the Supreme Court in R. v. Morin 1992 CanLII 89 (S.C.C.), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771. The Supreme Court had the opportunity in Morin to refine the determinations they had earlier made in R. v. Askov 1990 CanLII 45 (S.C.C.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 as to the meaning of the Charter guarantee of the right to trial within a reasonable time. Ms. Morin had been released on an appearance notice on January 9, 1988 for a first appearance date of February 23rd at which time she set what was described as the earliest trial date available to her of March 28, 1989. Her motion for unreasonable delay at her trial was dismissed and she was convicted, a decision that was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in dismissing her appeal.
[37] In doing so, the Court affirmed that the trial judge in considering an application for a stay must balance the individual’s interest in a fair and prompt adjudication of her charges with the societal interest in ensuring that those who transgress the law are dealt with according to law. Sopinka J. delineated the factors that must be considered in any such application. They included the length of the delay, any waiver of time periods, the reasons for the delay, including inherent time requirements of the case, the actions of the accused, the actions of the Crown, any limits on institutional resources and any other reasons for delay. Prejudice to the accused was also a factor that had to be considered.
[38] According to Sopinka J., the relevant time period for scrutiny is the time elapsed from the date of the charge to the end of the trial. He recognized that there are inherent paperwork and administrative requirements that are inevitable in every case. He therefore concluded that the period of institutional delay that should be considered by the Court is the period that starts when the parties are ready for trial and the system cannot accommodate them. A guideline for evaluating the reasonableness of such institutional delay would be a period of some 8 to 10 months. In Ms. Morin's case, even though this period had amounted to some 12 or 13 months, the Court held that the period was not unreasonable, particularly in the absence of any evidence showing prejudice to the accused.
[39] A number of other cases were cited to me by both defence and Crown but not surprisingly these cases tend to primarily turn on their individual facts. Defence cites for example R.